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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AND 
THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT FOR SEVIER COUNTY 
HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, JUDGE 
LIST OF PARTIES 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: 
BOYD A. WARD, 
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS: 
1. RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal corporation; 
2. RICHFIELD CITY COUNCIL, a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah; 
3. KENDRICK HARWARD, individually and in his official 
capacity as Mayor of Richfield City and as a member of the City 
Council; 
4. GLEN OGDEN, individually and in his official capacity 
as a member of the Richfield City Council; 
5. KAY KIMBALL, individually and in his official capacity 
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as a member of the Richfield City Council; 
7. DUANE WILSON, individually and in his official capacity 
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8. NAD BROWN, individually and in his official capacity as 
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9. WOODY FARNSWORTH, individually and in his official 
capacity as a member of the Richfield City Council. 
(Rule 24 (d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides that 
references to "appellant" and "respondents" shall be kept to a 
minimum to promote clarity; however, in this case the 
Defendants/Respondents are very diverse in nature, i.e. 
municipal corporation, mayor, city council, council members. In 
light of this diversity, it appears that clarity will be 
promoted by referring to Defendants/Respondents hereafter as 
"Respondents.") 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Appellant Boyd A. Ward, a dismissed 
marshal of Richfield City, a third class city, for general 
damages, punitive damages, reinstatement, award of back pay and 
benefits, attorney's fees, and other relief deemed appropriate 
by this Court. 
This case was initiated by Ward in June of 1981 when he 
obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (Record, pages 9 and 10) 
from the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth District Court Judge, and 
filed a Verified Complaint (Record, pages 1 to 8) against 
Respondents challenging the firing of Ward as marshal or chief 
of police of Richfield City. All of the Respondents were served 
with a Temporary Restraining Order prior to a special city 
council meeting held on June 8, 1981. Thereafter, a hearing for 
a preliminary injunction was held before the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs on June 17, 1981. In that hearing the District Court 
ruled that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 10-3-911 (1953) it 
had no jurisdiction to interfere with the actions of Richfield 
City (Record, pages 57 and 58). 
PRIOR DISPOSITION IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Thereafter, Ward appealed the first decision of the District 
Court to the Supreme Court, Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265 
(Utah 1984). This Court ruled that Utah Code Ann. Section 
10-3-911 (1953) did not pertain to Richfield City, a third class 
city, and, therefore, the District Court did have jurisdiction. 
The case was remanded to the District Court on April 16, 1986, 
for further proceedings upon its merits. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
On July 30, 1986, the District Court heard Ward's Motion for 
Change of Venue, Motion to Amend the Complaint, Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion for Summary Judgment* The 
Court also heard Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court denied Ward's Motion for Change of Venue, granted Ward's 
Motion to Amend the Complaint, denied Ward's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, and ruled the original Temporary 
Restraining Order terminated on June 17, 1981, (Record, pages 
391 and 392). The District Court took under advisement the two 
Motions for Summary Judgment and subsequently denied Ward's 
Motion and granted Richfieldfs Motion (Record, pages 386 to 
388). Copies of both Orders are in the Addendum. Ward appealed 
the decision of the District Court to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
DISPOSITION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the 
District Court and entered the decision on June 14, 1989, Ward 
v. Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). On July 
10, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied Ward's Petition for 
Rehearing. Subsequently, the Utah Supreme Court granted Ward's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Ward hereby requests that this 
Court reverse the decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
District Court and enter judgment in favor of Ward. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While Ward was marshal of Richfield City, Respondents caused 
an agenda to be prepared and distributed which listed the 
anticipated activities for the Richfield City Council meeting on 
April 2, 1981; however, the agenda did not contain the 
information that Respondents were going to consider terminating 
Ward as marshal. Respondents went into a closed meeting and all 
members of the public who were in attendance at the open meeting 
were excluded from the closed meeting. Kent Colby, an 
individual who was excluded from the closed meeting, requested 
that Respondents contact him in the event the closed meeiting 
ended so that he could be present if Respondents took any 
further action affecting the community. In the closed meeting 
Respondents discussed terminating Ward as marshal. Respondents 
did not advise the public that they were going back into open 
meeting. Respondents entered the termination of Ward in the 
minutes of the City Council meeting after the closed meeting was 
concluded. Ward was terminated as marshal or chief of police, 
effective on April 3, 1981. On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted to 
Respondents a written request for a hearing to appeal his 
termination. Respondents did not allow Ward a hearing to appeal 
his termination. 
On Tuesday, June 2, 1981, Ward advised Respondents he 
intended to take legal action to challenge his termination. On 
Friday, June 5, 1981, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Respondents 
caused notice to be given to the local newspaper, The Richfield 
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Reaper, and the local radio station, KSVC, that a non-scheduled 
city council meeting was to be held on Monday, June 8, 1981, at 
8:00 a.m. On June 8, 1981, prior to the city council meeting, 
Respondents were served with a Temporary Restraining Order by 
which Respondents were "ORDERED that the defendants, and each of 
them, be and they are hereby temporarily restrained and enjoined 
from taking any further action against plaintiff by way of 
terminating plaintiff's services as chief of police of Richfield 
City." Respondents, after being served the Temporary 
Restraining Order, took action against Ward to terminate him as 
chief of police of Richfield City by attempting to ratify the 
previous action taken by Respondents in the closed meeting on 
April 2, 1981. 
In the initial hearing before the trial court on June 17, 
1981, the parties stipulated to specific facts. These 
stipulated facts are set forth below and reference is made to 
the pages of the record where the stipulations are found: 
1. The agenda for the April 1, 1981, Richfield City 
Council meeting did not state that the Respondents were going to 
terminate of Ward as chief of police (Record, page 47). 
2. During the Richfield City Council meeting, Respondents 
went into a closed meeting (Record, page 47). 
3. At the time that the Richfield City Council went into 
closed meeting, the members of the public that were in 
attendance at the open meeting were excluded from the closed 
meeting (Record, page 47). 
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4. Kent Colby, the representative of KSVC Radio Station 
who was a member of the public present at the city council 
meeting when the Richfield City Council went into the closed 
meeting, requested that he be contacted so that he could be 
present if Respondents went back into open meeting to transact 
any further business (Record, pages 48 and 49). 
5. The Respondents did not communicate to Colby that they 
were going back into open meeting to transact further public 
business so that Colby could be present (Record, pages 48 and 
49). 
6. Ward was terminated as chief of police at the April 2, 
1981, meeting by the Richfield City Council effective April 3, 
1981 (Record, page 50). 
7. Termination of Ward as chief of police was entered on 
the minutes of the city council meeting after the closed meeting 
was concluded (Record, page 50). 
8. On Tuesday, June 2, 1981, the Respondents, through 
their attorney, were advised that Ward intended to take action 
pursuant to the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act (Record, page 
51 ). 
9. On Friday, June 5, 1981, at approximately 5:30 p.m., 
notice of an unscheduled Richfield City Council meeting to be 
held on Monday, June 8, 1981, at 8:00 a.m. was given by the 
Respondents to the local newspaper, Richfield Reaper, and the 
local radio station, KSVC (Record, page 51). 
10. On Monday, June 8, 1981, prior to the unscheduled 
meeting, the Respondents were served a Temporary Restraining 
Order providing as follows: 
It is ordered that the defendants and each of them be and 
they are hereby temporarily restrained and enjoined from 
taking any further action against plaintiff by way of 
terminating plaintiff's services as Chief of Police of 
Richfield City. (Record, pages 51 and 52.) 
11. The Respondents, after having been served the Temporary 
Restraining Order, violated the Temporary Restraining Order and 
took action against Ward to terminate him as chief of police 
(Record, page 52). 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The District Court allowed Ward to file an amended complaint 
(Record, pages 360 to 375, 391 and 392). The amended complaint 
set forth an alternative cause of action that if Ward 
was legally fired that he was entitled to a hearing to appeal 
the firing. Since the trial court granted Respondents1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment, all of the facts alleged by Ward must be 
viewed in a light favorable to Ward. The pertinent facts 
alleged by Ward are set forth below: 
12. On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted to Richfield City a 
written request for a hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 (1953) to appeal his 
termination as chief of police (Record, pages 293 to 300 and 
page 373, Exhibit "B"). 
13. Ward did not receive a hearing in response to his 
written request to appeal his termination (Record, pages 293 to 
299). 
14. The Richfield City Council enacted the Richfield City 
Police Department Policies and Procedures Manual which was in 
effect on April 2, 1981 (Record, pages 328 to 331, Exhibit "D M). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I 
The District Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 
prohibiting the Respondents from taking action to terminate Ward 
as chief of police. On June 8, 1981, the Respondents violated 
the Temporary Restraining Order by terminating Ward as chief of 
police of Richfield City. Subsequently, the District Court 
speicfically ruled that the Temporary Restraining Order was 
effective until June 17, 1981. Therefore, the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals erred in not voiding the actions of the 
Respondents on June 8, 1981, that were in violation of the 
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the District Court. 
The Supreme Court should void the actions of the Respondents 
which were in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order of 
the District Court. 
ISSUE II 
The District Court relied upon Utah Code Ann. Section 
10-6-32 (1953) in the Order granting Respondents' Motion for 
Summary Judgement. The statute had been repealed in 1977, which 
was four years prior to the acts of the Respondents in 1981 
which gave rise to this lawsuit. The decision of the District 
Court granting the Summary Judgment and the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirming the Summary Judgment should be 
reversed on the basis of manifest error. 
ISSUE III 
The Respondents did not list on the agenda for the April 1, 
1981, city council meeting that Respondents were going to 
consider terminating Ward as chief of police. The Utah Open and 
Public Meetings Act contained in Utah Code Ann.# Title 52, 
Chapter 4, in particular Section 52-4-6 (1986) specifically 
requires that a city council must provide 24 hours notice of the 
agenda of the meeting. The agenda contained the term "other 
business." Nevertheless, the reference to "other business" was 
not sufficient to give adequate notice of the intent of the 
Respondents to terminate Ward as chief of police. Therefore, 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in not voiding 
the action of the Respondents in terminating Ward because the 
Respondents failed to list the item of business on the 
statutorily required agenda. The Supreme Court should rule that 
the Respondents action is void. 
ISSUE IV 
The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. Title 
52, Chapter 4, in particular Section 52-4-4 specifically 
prohibits any ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract 
or appointment to be enacted at a closed meeting. The 
Respondents entered into a closed meeting, and while in the 
closed meeting, terminated Ward as chief of police. The 
District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in not voiding the 
action of the Respondents firing Ward in a closed meeting. The 
Supreme Court should rule that the firing of Wad is void because 
it was done in a closed meeting. 
ISSUE V 
Ward, as a marshal in a third class city, has a right of 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and 
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10-3-1106 (1953). The Respondents refused to give Ward an 
appeal of his termination after he requested it in writing. The 
District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the 
action of the Respondents denying Ward a hearing to appeal his 
termination. The Supreme Court should reverse that decision. 
ISSUE VI 
Appellate procedure requires that an appellate court must 
review a Summary Judgment granted by a trial court and all facts 
involved in a light favorable to the appellant. However, in 
this casei the Court of Appeals has not only disregarded the 
facts stipulated to by both parties, but has relied upon facts 
supplied by the Respondents to uphold the Summary Judgment 
against the Appellant. The Supreme Court should reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals because of this departure from 
normal appellate procedures. 
ISSUE VII 
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Open and Public 
Meetings Act in Utah Code Ann., Title 52, Chapter 4. In Section 
52-4-1, the Legislature specifically set forth the intent of the 
Act. However, the District Court and the Court of Appeals has 
subsituted their own discretion in place of the written intent 
of the Legislature. Therefore, the Supreme Court should reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals and the District Court. 
ISSUE VIII 
The Utah Court of Appeals in its decision affirming the 
Summary Judgment against Ward, specifically held that Ward was a 
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member of the Richfield City Police Department, However, the 
Court of Appeals then proceded to deny Ward the right to appeal 
his termination pursuant to the Richfield City Police Department 
Policies and Procedures Manual. It is inconsistent for the 
Court of Appeals to rule that although Ward was a member of the 
police department, he did not have a right of appeal pursuant to 
the policies and procedures manual because he was chief of 
police. The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed 
and a ruling entered that Ward had a right of appeal, not only 
statutorily, but also pursuant to the policies and procedures 
manual. 
ISSUE IX 
The District Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 
which terminated on June 17, 1981. However, on June 8, 1981, 
while the Temporary Restraining Order was in effect, the 
Respondents violated the Temporary Restraining Order by 
terminating Ward as chief of police. Nothwithstanding the 
specific direction of the District Court that the Temporary 
Restraining Order terminated on June 17, 1981, neither the 
District Court nor the Court of Appeals voided the action of the 
Respondents when they violated the Temporary Restraining Order 
on June 8, 1981. A municipality should not be allowed to 
violate any Order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The 
Utah Supreme Court should reverse the decisions of the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the actions of the 
Respondents on June 8, 1981, in violation of the Temporary 
Restraining Order are void. 
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ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I 
THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT 
VOIDING ALL ACTS OF THE RESPONDENTS TAKEN ON JUNE 8, 1981, 
WHICH WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
WHICH THE DISTRICT COURT RULED WAS EFFECTIVE TO JUNE 17, 
1981. 
A review of the transcript of the June 17, 1981, hearing 
(Record, pages 57 through 58) clearly shows that the District 
Court did not address the merits of the Temporary Restraining 
Order. The District Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction. 
Therefore, having ruled that it had no jurisdiction, the 
District Court could not address the merits of the Temporary 
Restraining Order until the Supreme Court remanded the case in 
April of 1986 in Ward v. Richfield Cityf 716 P.2d 265 (Utah 
1984). Accordingly, the District Court had jurisdiction to 
determine when the Temporary Restraining Order terminated. The 
District Court ruled that the Temporary Restraining Order 
terminated on June 17, 1981. 
In any event, it is obvious from the October 22, 1986, Order 
(Record, pages 391 and 391) of the District Court that the Court 
never ruled the Temporary Restraining Order to be invalid. 
Moreover, the Order of the District Court provided that the 
Temporary Restraining Order was effective to June 17, 1981. 
However, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals 
voided the action of Respondents on June 8, 1981 (nine days 
prior to June 17, 1981) terminating Ward as chief of police. 
Consequently, the city council meeting of the Respondents on 
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June 8# 1981# should be declared void and in violation of the 
Temporary Restraining Order. 
ISSUE II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON UTAH CODE ANN. 
SECTION 10-6-32 (1953), TO GRANT RESPONDENTS1 MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENY WARD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE STATUTE WAS REPEALED BY THE UTAH STATE 
LEGISLATURE IN 1977, AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 
THIS CASE WHICH AROSE IN 1981. 
The stipulated facts clearly establish that this case arose 
in 1981. The Order granting Richfieldfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Record, pages 386 to 388) cites Utah Code Ann. Section 
10-6-32 (1953), as the controlling statute to justify the 
ruling. The statute states as follows: 
10-6-32. Term of Appointed Officers -Removal.-
Except as otherwise provided by law, the term of 
office of all appointive officers in cities shall be 
until the municipal election next following their 
appointment unless they are sooner removed by the 
board of commissioners of cities of the first and 
second class, or in cities of the third class by the 
mayor with the concurrence of a majority of the 
members of the city council, or by the city council 
with the concurrence of the mayor. 
(Attached in the Addendum is a copy of the above statute.) 
However, Section 10-6-32 was repealed in 1977. Utah Code Ann. 
Section 10-1-114 (1953), enacted in 1977, provides in part as 
follows: 
10-1-114. Repealer. 
The following acts, chapters, titles, and 
sections are repealed except as provided in Section 
10-1-115: 
(1) Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 14 of Title 
10,... 
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A review of the current compiler's notes in the Utah Code 
further clarifies that Section 10-1-114 repealed section 10-6-32 
in 1977. Chapter 3 of Title 10 is the current source of 
statutes which pertain to the case at hand* 
Since Section 10-6-32 was repealed in 1977 and this case 
arose in 1981, the trial court erred in relying upon Section 
10-6-32 in ruling against Ward. The Supreme Court should 
reverse the Order of the trial court on the basis of manifest 
error. 
ISSUE III 
THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN 
RULING THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT HAVE TO LIST ALL 
MATTERS THEY INTENDED TO CONSIDER ON THE AGENDA AS 
REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 52-4-6 (1953). 
Utah Code Ann. Section 52-4-6 (1953), provides that a city 
council must provide 24 hours notice of the agenda of the meeting: 
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of 
subsection (1) of this section, each public body 
shall give not less than 24 hours1 public notice of 
the agenda, date, time and place of each of its 
meetings. (Emphasis added.) 
As stipulated by the parties, Respondents did not cause the 
agenda of the Richfield City Council meeting to state that 
Respondents would consider terminating Ward as marshal. Neither 
Ward, nor any other member of the public had any opportunity to 
voice opinion about the termination of Ward as marshal because 
no one, except Respondents, knew that the matter would be 
considered. Moreover, as established by the stipulated facts, 
neither Ward nor any other member of the public knew what was 
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happening after Respondents went into the closed meeting. Under 
these circumstances, there is absolutely no way that Ward or any 
other member of the public could have known or opposed the 
actions of Respondents. Therefore, Respondents violated Section 
52-4-6 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. 
In the Record at pages 290 to 291 is the affidavit of Boyd 
Adams. Adams was the marshal or chief of police in American 
Fork City, Utah. The American Fork City Mayor intended to 
appoint another individual as marshal. The intention to fire 
Adams was listed on the agenda for the American Fork City 
Council meeting; however, the citizens of American Fork voiced 
their opinions that they wanted to keep Adams as the marshal. 
Consequently, the Mayor and City Council reappointed Adams to 
the position. Not only is Adam's affidavit on point, but the 
experience of Adams illustrates why it is very important that 
all items of public business be specifically listed on the 
agenda in order for the public to know what is happening at a 
city council meeting. 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines the word 
"agenda" as follows: "a list, outline, or plan of things to be 
considered or done." In other words, the agenda, as intended by 
the statute, is the document stating the things which will be 
considered or done by a public body. It is more than a notice 
of the time and place of the meeting. Furthermore, Utah Code 
Ann. Section 52-4-1 (1953) states as follows: 
Declaration of Public Policy. 
In enacting this chapter, the legislature finds 
and declares that the state, its agencies, and 
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political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of 
the people's business. It is the intent of the law that 
their actions be taken openly and that their 
deliberations be conducted openly. (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, the public would not have notice of the public 
business to be conducted by a city council unless everything is 
listed in detail on the required agenda. 
In June of 1978, the Office of the Attorney General 
published the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act Manual. 
Beginning at page 19 of the manual are the following questions 
and answers: 
Question No. 23. What are the notice requirements of 
the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act? 
Answer: The right of citizens to attend meetings of 
public bodies and to make their views known to said public 
bodies upon issues of general or limited public importance 
requires they be given an oportunity to know in advcince when 
and where such meetings are to be held and the matters to be 
considered thereat. Thus Section 54-4-6, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as most recently amended by the 1978 Budget 
Session of the Utah Legislature, provides for the following 
notice requirements for annually scheduled meetings, all 
meetings, and emergency meetings: 
Annually Meeting Schedule. Any public body which 
holds regular meetings scheduled in advance over the* course 
of a year shall give public notice at least once each year 
of its annual meeting schedule specifying the date, time and 
place of such meetings. 
All Meetings. In addition to the annual meeting 
schedule, each public body shall give not less than 24 
hours1 public notice of the agenda, date, time and place of 
each of its meetings. 
Emergency Meetings. If unforeseen circumstances make 
it necessary for a public body to hold an emergency meeting 
to consider matters of an emergency or urgent nature*, the 
foregoing 24 hour public notice requirement may be 
disregarded and "the best notice practicable given." 
However, no emergency meeting shall be held unless an 
attempt has been made to notify all members of the public 
body and a majority thereof votes to hold such meeting. 
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The "public notice" required in all meetings except 
emergency meetings# is satisfied by: (1) posting written 
notice at the principal office of the public body, or if no 
such office exists, at the building where the meeting is to 
be held; and (2) providing notice to at least one newspaper 
of general circulation within the geographic jurisdiction of 
the public body, or to a local media correspondent. 
*** 
Question No. 26: What circumstances would justify an 
emergency meeting under the Act? 
Answer: Since the notice and agenda of each meeting of 
a public body must ordinarily be posted and delivered at 
least 24 hours before the actual meeting, there may occur 
unforeseen circumstances requiring action by the public body 
which will not permit such notice* Under these 
circumstances the legislature has provided that the public 
body can hold an emergency meeting to consider such 
emergency or urgent matters by giving "the best notice 
practicable." In the opinion of the Attorney General, an 
emergency meeting must be related to an item which was which 
was truly unforeseen at the time of the posting and delivery 
of the next regular meeting agenda and such item must be of 
such an emergency or urgent nature that immediate action is 
required. 
Question No. 27: What would constitute "the best 
notice practicable" for an emergency meeting of a public 
body under the Act? 
Answer: If the emergency matter arises during a 
regular meeting of the public body it should be scheduled 
for consideration at an "emergency meeting" upon a majority 
vote of the public body, after which absent members thereof 
should be notified or an attempt should.be made to notify 
them of such emergency emeting. In addition, the "best 
notice practicable" should be given to the press or media of 
the date, time, place and purpose of such emergency 
meeting. Such notice could be verbal or written, as 
circumstances warrant, but written notice would be 
preferable if possible... Thus, the notice requirements for 
"emergency meetings" should be the same as those for regular 
meetings whenever circumstances permit. Only when regular 
notice requirements cannot reasonably be met would anything 
less constitute the "best notice practicable" under the 
Act. Emergency meeting procedures should be used only when 
absolutely necessary. 
Thus, it is very clear from the manual that all items to be 
considered by a city council must be listed on the agenda. 
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These requirements may be relaxed in the event of an emergency 
situation; however, if an emergency develops during a regularly 
scheduled city council meeting and the matter is not on the 
agenda, the public body must give the "best notice practicable" 
before considering the emergency. Consequently, Respondents 
could not legally terminate Ward on April 2, 1981, because the 
matter was not listed on the agenda and no notice of any kind 
was given to the public. It was necesary for Respondents to 
list the matter on the agenda for the next city council meeting 
or, if it was necessary, give other "practicable notice." 
A statement such as "other business," which the Respondents 
had on the agenda, is not sufficient to meet the notice 
requirement. If such a statement were sufficient, public bodies 
would be tempted to give themselves large salaries, enter into 
unfavorable financial obligations or do other things which the 
general public would not approve of or accept under the term 
"other business." 
Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986), stresses the 
importance of municipalities complying with statutory 
requirements. Therefore, this court should reverse the decision 
of the District Court and the Court of Appeals and rule that 
Respondents could not terminate Ward without listing the 
intended action on the agenda for the city council meeting. 
ISSUE IV 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT 
VOIDING THE ACTION OF RESPONDENTS TO TERMINATE THE 
EMPLOYMENT OF WARD, WHICH ACTION WAS TAKEN IN A CLOSED 
MEETING IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. SECTIONS 52-4-3 AND 
52-4-6 (1953). 
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The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act is contained in Utah 
Code Ann* Title 52, Chapter 4. Section 52-4-9 provides as 
follows: 
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may 
commence suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to compel 
compliance with or enjoin violations of this chapter or to 
determine its applicability to discussions or decisions of a 
public body. The court may award reasonable attorney fees 
and court costs to a successful plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondents violated the procedural safeguards established 
by the State of Utah for conductng public business. Section 
52-4-4 states as follows: 
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote 
of two-thirds of the members of the public body present at 
an open meeting for which notice is given pursuant to 
Section 52-4-6; provided, a quorum is present. No closed 
meeting is allowed except as to matters exempted under 
Section 52-4-5; providedf no ordinancef resolutionf rulef 
regulation, contractf or appointment shall be approved at a 
closed meeting. The reason or reasons for holding a closed 
meeting and the vote, either for or against the proposition 
to hold such a meeting, cast by each meember by name shall 
be entered on the minutes of the meeting. (Emphasis added.) 
An examination of the minutes of the meeting (Record, pages 341 
to 345) definitely shows that the Respondents did not list the 
reason for the closed meeting on April 2, 1981, nor did they 
list by name the council members voting in favor of the closed 
meeting. Thereafter, there is a statement that a minute entry 
was made after executive session, but nothing in the minutes 
shows that a vote was taken to go into open meeting after the 
closed meeting was concluded, nor is there anything to indicate 
that the closed meeting was properly terminated. 
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Respondents caused all members of the public to be excused 
from the city council meeting (Record, page 47). Neither Ward 
nor any member of the public was advised that Respondents were 
going back into an open meeting to take action against Ward 
(Record, pages 48 and 49)j therefore, the Respondents were still 
in a secret or closed meeting. Thus, the resolution passed by 
the Respondents was in violation of Section 52-4-4 of the Utah 
Open and Public Meetings Act. 
As has been referred to previously in this Brief, Boyd Adams 
was marshal in American Fork City, Utah. The mayor intended to 
appoint another person as marshal. However, the citizens of 
American Fork City voiced their opinion that they wanted to keep 
Adams as the marshal to the extent that the mayor and city 
council reappointed him to the position. Therefore, in light of 
the experience of Adams, it is essential that public bodies not 
be allowed to enact resolutions in closed meetings. 
Ward calls the Court's attention to the minutes for May 7, 
1981 (Record, pages 346 to 349) wherein Item 5 states: 
5. MINUTES. It was decided that the minutes of the 
last meeting would not be approved until a later date 
after Ken Chamberlain, City Attorney, had reviewed them. 
The purpose of minutes is to record what actually transpired in 
the city council meetings and not what should have transpired. 
The mintues for May 28, 1981, Item 3 (Record, pages 350 to 353) 
state as follows: 
3. MINUTES REVIEWED. The mintues of the April 2, 1981, 
meeting were reviewed. Ken Chamberlain had previously 
reviewed the minutes and clarified the minute entry. 
Nad Brown motioned that the minutes of the April 1, 1981, 
meeting be approved with the changes stated. Kay Kimball 
seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously... 
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It is interesting to note that the minute entry indicates 
that the city attorney clarified the minute entry. There is 
nothing in the April 2, 1981, minutes (Record, pages 341 to 345) 
to indicate that the city attorney was present at the meeting so 
that he would have the knowledge to add any appropriate 
clarifications. Respondents either conducted the meeting 
according to the correct procedures, or they did not. 
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with the Open and Public 
Meetings Act in Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, 598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979). In that case this Court 
determined that the Utah Public Service Commission could use 
closed meetings for deliberation purposes. Nevetheless, this 
Court determined that even the Utah Public Service Commission, 
with its unique need to deliberate in private, had to conform 
with the Open and Public Meetings Act in any final orders and 
formal actions by issuing these decisions in a meeting open to 
the public. The Court stated at page 1315 as follows: 
Whether the "decision making" phase is accomplished 
in such a private meeting, or in private deliberations, 
it is to be observed that the statute further provides 
that at such a closed meeting, "no ordinance, resolution, 
rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall be 
approved." In conformity with that statute, any final 
and formal action of the Commission on such matters should 
be announced or issued in a meeting open to the public. 
Court in other jurisdictions have established similar 
precedents. In the case of Ahnert v. Sunnyside Unified School 
Dist. No. 12, 126 Ariz. 473, 616 P.2d 933 (Ariz. App. 1980), the 
Arizona Court of Appeals held that a school board action taken 
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in a closed meeting was void. The Arizona case is strikingly 
similar to the case at hand. The school district had two 
separate meetings; the first meeting was definitely a closed 
meeting in which it was decided to hire a particular edvtcational 
consultant and the second meeting was properly publicized and 
began as an open meeting. However, at approximately 6:50 p.m. 
the school board went into an executive session. At the time it 
went into the closed meeting it stated that it would reconvene 
into an open meeting if necessary to take any action that might 
be needed as a result of the closed meting. At page 935, the 
court determined the following pertaining to the first closed 
meetingf "The decision in this case, however, was made during a 
closed meeting and did not comply with the legislative intent." 
Discussing the second meeting which was called to ratify the 
first closed meeting, the Court stated at page 935 as follows: 
The announcement that the meeting would reconvene "if 
necessary" did not give sufficient public notice as to 
the time and place of the reconvened meeting. The 
board's resolution to ratify its previous actions at 
the reconvened meeting of June 21 therefore was void. 
In short, the Arizona Court voided all of the decisions of the 
school board which were made in violation of the Arizona open 
meetings laws. 
In the case of Pokorny v. City of Schuyler, 202 Neb. 334, 
275 N.W.2d 281 (Neb. 1979), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that 
the decision of the City of Schuyler to buy real estate was void 
when the decision was made in two consecutive meetings which 
violated the open meetings laws. At page 285 the court stated 
as follows: 
24 
The effect of the invalidity of the meetings of March 16 and 
March 25 is the same as if the meetings had never occurred. 
No action authorized at those meetings could be sustained by 
reliance upon the proceedings of the council at those 
meetings. 
Therefore, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the decisions of 
the two meetings were void just as if the two meetings had never 
been held. 
This Court has ruled in Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 
(Utah 1986), that an ordinance of the City of West Jordan was 
invalid because city officials did not follow statutory 
requirements in enacting the ordinance. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court should reverse the decision of the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals and rule that the action of Respondents in 
terminating Ward as marshal was void because it violated Section 
52-4-3 (prohibiting resolutions to be made ina a closed 
meeting). Ward should be awarded back pay, back benefits, 
attorney's fees, costs, and damages. 
ISSUE V 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING 
THAT WARD DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO APPEAL HIS TERMINATION 
OF EMPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. SECTIONS 10-3-1105 
AND 10-3-1106 (1953). 
Ward filed an amended verified complaint (Record, pages 360 
to 375) with an additional cause of action which is an 
alternative cause of action in which Ward alleged that the 
Respondents improperly denied Ward an appeal of his firing. The 
issue that a marshal in a third class city is entitled to appeal 
firing is extremely important, not only affecting Ward, but all 
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marshals and police officers in third class cities. Ward 
contends that, if legally fired, he has the right to a hearing 
to appeal that firing. 
In the case of Ward v. Richfield, 716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984), 
this Court stated at page 266 that the legislature had made a 
distinction between first and second class cities and cities of 
the third class pertaining to police as set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. as follows: 
1. First and Second Class Cities: 
a. Section 10-3-909 requires first and second class 
cities to "create, support, maintain and control a police 
department." 
b. Sections 10-3-913 through 10-3-915 set forth the 
duties and powers of the chief of police and police officers in 
first and second class cities. 
c. Sections 10-3-1001 through 10-3-1013 create the 
Civil Service Commission to hear the appeals of fired members of 
the police departments, fire departments and health departments 
in cities of the first and second class. 
2. Third Class Cities: 
a. Section 10-3-918 provides for the chief of police 
or marshal in third class cities and assistants to the chief of 
police or marshal. 
b. Section 10-3-919 conveys upon the chief of police, 
marshals, and their assistants in cities of the third class the 
rights and duties respectively conferred upon such officers in 
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first and second class cities in Sections 10-3-913 through 
10-3-915. 
c* Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 create the 
Appeals Board to hear the appeals of fired appointed officials 
and municipal employees (including marshals and their 
assistants) in cities of the third class, 
Thusf it is clear that the Utah Legislature has enacted two 
distinct sets of statutes which pertain to the termination and 
appeal process for municipal employees* The first set of 
statutes are Sections 10-3-1001 through 10-3-1013 which pertain 
to the police departments and fire departments of cities of the 
first and second class. These statutes establish the discharge 
and appeal procedures for members of those departments. It 
should be noted that in the case of Worrall v. Ogden City Fire 
Department, 616 FP.2d 598 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that a person discharged from a department must be 
informed of his right to a hearing. 
The statutes cited above pertain to the Civil Service 
Commission and specifically refer to "departments." As noted 
above, Section 10-3-909 requires each city of the first and 
second class to establish a "police department." On the other 
hand# Section 10-3-918 authorizes a third class city to appoint 
assistants to the marshal. Although a third class city may 
refer to its marshal and police officers as "a department," for 
the purpose of these statutes and the appeal procedures, only 
first and second class cities have "police departments" while 
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third class cities have a chief of police or marshal and 
assistants. It is important to recognize the distinction by 
which organizations are defined as "departments." Otherwise, 
confusion can be created when reviewing the two separate methods 
of appeal. 
The second set of statutes which pertain to municipal 
employees are Sections 10-3-1103 through 10-3-1107. These 
statutes are referred to as Personnel, Rules and Benefits. 
Section 10-3-1105 states as follows: 
All appointive officers and employees of 
municipalities, other than members of the police 
departmentsy fire departments, heads of departmentsP and 
superintendents, shall hold their employment without 
limitation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal 
only as hereinafter provided. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-3-1106 sets forth the procedures 
for appeal of discharge or transfer. Section 10-3-1106 (2) 
requires a written notice of the appeal within ten (10) days 
after the discharge. The subsequent subparagraphs set forth the 
procedures and time frames of the appeal process. Subparagraph 
(5) provides in part, "in no case shall the appointive officer 
or employee be discharged or transferred when appeal is taken, 
except upon a concurrence of at least a majority of the 
membership of the governing body of the minicipality." Ward was 
discharged on April 2, 1981, and on April 6, 1981 (Record, pages 
300 and 373, Exhibit "B"), submitted his written request for 
appeal. Respondents did not provide Ward a hearing in response 
to his written request for an appeal hearing (Record, pages 293 
to 300). 
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Therefore, it is the contention of Ward that a marshal or 
chief of police in a third class city and all of the police 
officers who are appointed as assistants to the chief of police 
have the right to appeal their termination pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106. Analyzing the 
Legislature's use of the word "department" as pertaining 
specifically to police, fire and health "departments" in first 
and second class cities whose rights of appeal are covered in 
Sections 10-3-1001 through 10-3-1013, it becomes clear that 
there are two separate sets of statutes pertaining to the 
appeals of municipal employees and that Ward has the right to 
appeal the termination of employment pursuant to Sections 
10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106. 
It should be noted that Section 10-3-911, which was the 
subject of the original appeal to the Supreme Court in this 
case, was repealed by the Legislature in 1987. Now there is 
only one municipal employee position which can be terminated 
without any recourse. This Court is referred to Sections 
10-3-924 through 10-3-926 which provide for the appointment, 
term of office, and duties of a city manager. Section 10-3-925 
provides as follows: 
The manager shall serve at the pleasure of the governing 
body except that the governing body may employ the manager 
for a term not to exceed three years. The term of 
employment may be renewed at any time. Any person serving 
as manager of a municipality under this section may be 
removed with or without cause by a majority vote of the 
governing body. (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Legislature has provided for the appeal of all 
municipal emplyees, whether they are members of a department or 
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not, with the exception of the city manager. However, in 
providing that the city manager serves at the "pleasure of the 
governing body," the Legislature has made its intent clear that 
there is no appeal process for the city manager. Therefore, it 
should be ruled that the termination of the marshal of a third 
class city is governed by lthe appeal procedures of Section 
10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106. 
In the case of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Rothy 
408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court stated at 92 S.Ct. 2709 as follows: 
Certain attributes of "property" interests protected by 
procedural due process everge from these decisions [cases 
cited in previous paragraph]. To have a property interest 
in a benefit, a person clearly must have more that an 
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more that a 
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is the purpose of 
the ancient institution of property to protect those claims 
upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that 
must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the 
constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity 
for a person to vindicate those claims. 
Property interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions 
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as State law rules or 
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support 
claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus, the welfare 
recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, had a claim of 
entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the 
statute defining eligibility for them. The recipients had 
not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory 
terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a right to 
a hearing at which they might attempt to do so. 
In the case of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 
2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), the United States Supreme Court 
stated as follows at 92 S.Ct. 2700: 
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We disagree with the Court of Appeals insofar as it held 
that a mere subjective "expectancy" is protected by 
procedural due process, but we agree that the respondent 
must be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his 
claim of such entitlement in light of "the policies and 
practices of the institution." 430 F.2d, at 943. Proof of 
such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him 
to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate college 
officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could 
be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and 
challenge their sufficiency. 
Therefore, in light of the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court and the prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, 
it is clear that if Respondents acted legally to fire Ward, Ward 
has a right to a hearing to protect his property interest in 
continued employment. 
It is not the intention of Ward to argue that a third class 
city cannot discharge its marshal for cause. Nevertheless, Ward 
argues that Respondents should follow the hearing and appeal 
process for appointive officers and employees as set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106. 
Again, Ward cites this Court in Ward v. Richfield Cityf 716 
P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984), which states: 
"It probably is not wholly inaccurate to suppose that 
ordinarily when people say one thing they do not mean 
something else." 1AC Sands, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction, Section 47-01 as cited in Hansen v. Wilkinson, 
Utah, 658 P.2d (1983). We construe a statute on the 
assumption that each term is used advisedly and that the 
intent of the legislature is revealed in the use of the term 
in the context of the structure in which it is place. 
Therefore, Ward respectfully requests that this Court rule 
that the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling 
that Ward does not have a right to appeal his termination 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106. 
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ISSUE VI 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ISSUED A DECISION IN CONFLICT WITH 
DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM 
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY 
IGNORING THE STIPULATED FACTS AND FACTS SET FORTH BY 
APPELLANT AND RELYING UPON THE FACTS OF THE RESPONDENTS IN 
AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
APPELLANT. 
When a Judgment is entered pursuant to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment/ the Court of Appeals, or any appellate court, must 
analyze the Judgment in a light favorable to the facts of the 
Appellant and, basically, accept the facts of the Appellant as 
being true; however, the Court of Appeals in its opinion has 
relied upon and cited several facts set forth by the Respondents 
and contested by the Appellant. Moreover, the facts relied upon 
by the Court of Appeals are contradicted by the stipulated 
facts, which stipulated facts are binding upon both the parties 
and the Court. 
On page two of the decision of the Court of Appeals (the 
decision is set forth in the Addendum), the Court stated, "The 
Council was concerned about several recent resignations within 
the Police Department." The Appellant disputed the allegation 
that there had been recent resignations. There had been 
resignations or terminations of six officers over a period of 
six years. Some had taken place prior to Ward becoming chief of 
police. Moreover, in the Record at pages 281 to 288 is the 
Affidavit of John Bettfruend disputing the allegations. 
Bettfruend was the acting chief of police after Ward was 
dismissed and had previously been a police officer in Richfield. 
32 
Bettfruend stated that he was not aware of any threats of 
officers who intended to resign. 
Of particular importance is the first footnote on page 3 of 
the copy of the Court of Appeals' decision found in the Addendum 
hereto. The footnote reads as follows: 
1• Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether 
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session resumed. 
Most of those present were members of the media and they 
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, but 
wanted to be advised if action were taken. 
The Court of Appeals took the statement in footnote one directly 
from either the Affidavit of Respondents Kendrick Harward or 
Woody Farnsworth. In the court Record at page 229, Respondent 
Harward stated: 
All media representatives were asked if they wanted to be 
notified if open session resumed. All responded in words or 
to the effect that "we do not necessarily want to return but 
if action is taken, advise us what action the Council 
takes." 
In the Record at page 238, Respondent Farnsworth made the exact 
same statement. It is obvious that footnote one was obtained by 
the Court of Appeals directly from the Affidavits of the 
Respondents. 
In contrast to footnote one and the affidavits of the 
Respondents, is the Affidavit of Kent Colby, a media member who 
was present at the city council meeting. Colbyfs Affidavit is 
located at pages 277 to 279 of the Record. The Affidavit of 
Colby was submitted in opposition to the Respondents' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. In part, Colby's Affidavit states as follows: 
4. That affiant asked the Mayor and City Council if 
they would come back into session. The general response was 
that they would not come back into session unless they 
needed to take any action. Woody Farnsworth, Richfield City 
Manager and one of the defendants herein, replied that he 
didn't think the council would take any action that night, 
but if it did it would be significant. Farnsworth inquired 
of affiant if affiant wanted to be contacted if the City 
Council were to take any action. Another member of the City 
Council stated that the executive session would not last 
very long and that affiant and the representative from the 
Richfield Reaper could wait if they desired. 
5. That affiant told Farnsworth that affiant wanted 
to be present if the City Council took any action and 
requested that affiant be called. Farnsworth indicated that 
affiant would be called. 
6. That affiant and the reporter for the Richfield 
Reaper, who were excused from the closed session, thought 
the meeting would be short and stayed outside for 
approximately an hour waiting for it to end. While waiting 
outside, the affiant and the other reporter speculated about 
the subject of the closed meeting because neither knew what 
the Richfield City Council was considering. 
7. That after approximately one hour of waiting 
without any word from the City Council, affiant and the 
reporter from the Richfield Reaper left to go home. 
8. That at approximately 11:30 p.m. affiant received 
a phone call from Farnsworth, a defendant herein, whereby 
Farnsworth read the prepared press release to affiant 
stating that Boyd Ward had been fired as Chief of Police of 
Richfield City. 
9. That at no time after affiant was excused from the 
closed meeting and had requested to be notified in order to 
be present if the City Council was going to take any action, 
did he receive any other communication from the City Council 
other than the 11:30 p.m phone call announcing that Boyd 
Ward had been fired as chief of police. 
Obviously, the above facts from the Affidavit of Colby are in 
direct contradiction to the facts as stated by the Respondents 
and as relied upon by the Court of Appeals. 
Of greater significance is the conflict between the facts 
relied upon by the Court of Appeals and the facts to which the 
parties stipulated in open court before the District Court 
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Judge. These stipulated facts are binding not only upon the 
parties, but also upon the Court. The stipulated facts are as 
follows: 
4. Kent Colby, the representative of KSVC Radio 
Station, who was a member of the public present when 
Richfield went into closed meeting, requested that he be 
contacted so that he could be present if Respondents went 
back into open meeting to transact any further business 
(Record, pages 48 and 49). 
5. The Respondents did not communicate to Colby that 
they were going back into open meeting to transact further 
public business so that Colby could be present (Record, 
pages 48 and 49). 
These stipulated facts are extemely significant. Utah Code 
Ann. Section 52-4-4 (1953) of the Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act in part specifically states, ft.. .provided, no ordinance, 
resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall be 
approved at a closed meeting..." Therefore, if one member of 
the public specifically requested to be present when the 
Respondents went back into open session and the Respondents did 
not communicate that they were going back into open session, the 
Respondents were still in a closed meeting because the public 
could not be present. Therefore, the Respondents were 
specifically prohibited by law from passing any resolution. 
The minutes of the city council meetings in the Record in 
this case show that all of the Respondents' decisions were done 
in the form of a resolution. A resolution is specifically 
prohibited by the statute from being enacted in a closed 
meeting. Therefore, if the Respondents were in a closed 
meeting, any resolution was in violation of the Utah Open and 
Public Meetings Act (Utah Code Ann. Section 52-4-1, et. seq.). 
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In support of Ward's position and in opposition to the 
Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment was an Affidavit of 
Boyd Adams (Record, pages 290 and 291), a former chief of police 
in American Fork City. The Affidavit clearly indicated that the 
agenda of the American Fork City Council stated that it was 
going to consider terminating Adams as chief of police. In 
response to the notice of the agenda, the public rallied behind 
Adams and caused the City Council to keep him on as the chief of 
police. This is a very significant fact opposing the 
Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment. When the people know 
what a public body is going to do, they can significantly 
influence the public body. The Affidavit of Adams is completely 
on point with this case. In its analysis the Court of Appeals 
should have made the assumption that the citizens of Richfield 
could have rallied behind Ward as the public rallied behind 
Adams. Subsequent to this termination, Ward was elected to the 
office of Constable, demonstrating his popularity with the 
citizens. 
It is very interesting to note that at page 3 in the 
decision of the Court of Appeals that it specifically found 
that, "The Council concluded the closed meeting with a unanimous 
vote, one member abstaining, to discharge Ward. Minutes of the 
closed meeting were recorded and when the Council resumed open 
session a formal vote to discharge Ward was taken.ff (Emphasis 
added.) Thus, the Court of Appeals found that a decision to 
terminate Appellant was made in the closed meeting. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that an appellate 
court must review the facts of the party against whom Summary 
Judgment has been granted in a manner most favorable to him. 
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289f 259 P.2d 297 (1953); 
Young v. Texas Co.f 8 Utah 2d 206# 331 P.2d 1099 (1958); Brandt 
v. Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960); 
Bridge v. Backmanf 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 (1960); Allen's 
Prods. Co. v. Glover, 18 Utah 2d 9, 414 P.2d 93 (1966); Geneva 
Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co.f 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
The Court of Appeals has not analyzed this case in a light 
favorable to the facts of the Appellant. In view of the 
Appellant's facts and the stipulated facts, it is obvious that 
Respondents did not publish an agenda and give notice that Ward 
would be fired. Furthermore, it is obvious that the Respondents 
actually made the decision in a closed meeting. Both actions 
violate the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. Moreover, the 
Affidavit of Adams establishes what can happen when public 
notice is given. Thus, on the basis of the facts asserted by 
Appellant and the stipulated facts, this Court should reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
ISSUE VII 
THE DECISIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS 
SUBSTITUTED THEIR OWN DISCRETION FOR SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH BY ALLOWING 
RESPONDENTS TO VIOLATE THE UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS 
ACT. 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals in their 
respective opinions have raised the question, "What is in the 
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public interest?" The legislature in Utah Code Ann, Section 
52-4-1 (1953) answers that question as follows: 
In enacting this chapter the legislature finds and 
declares that the State, its agencies and political 
subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the people's 
business. It is the intent of the law that the action of 
public bodies be taken openly and that the deliberations be 
conducted openly. 
It is an abuse of discretion for both the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals to substitute their perceptions of what is 
best for the public instead of upholding the written intent of 
the Legislature that the people's business must be deliberated 
and conducted openly. Thus, Ward respectfully argues that it is 
in the public interest for Respondents to comply strictly and 
completely with statutory procedures and with orders of the 
courts. It is not in the best interest of the people for any 
public body to violate statutes and court orders. Furthermore, 
the written intent of the Legislature should be upheld. 
ISSUE VIII 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SPECIFICALLY RULED THAT 
WARD WAS A MEMBER OF THE RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
BUT HAS INCORRECTLY DENIED HIM THE RIGHTS OF APPEAL EXTENDED 
TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT BY THE RICHFIELD 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURE MANUAL. 
Although Ward has argued that he has a statutory right to 
appeal his firing, he argues that he also has a right to appeal 
his termination pursuant to the Richfield City Police Department 
Policies and Procedures Manual. The Richfield City Council 
enacted the Richfield City Police Department Policies and 
Procedures Manual on January 8, 1981. A copy of the minutes of 
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the city council meeting for January 8, 1981, are found at pages 
238 through 331 of the Record. The policies and procedures set 
forth in the manual were in effect at the time Ward was 
terminated from his position as marshal on April 2, 1981 . 
Specifically, Subsection W. of the policies and procedures 
manual provides as follows: 
W. Appeals -
A member of the department may request a reveiw of 
disciplinary action by submitting a written request to the 
Chief of Police. Additional appeal procedures may be 
followed in the Richfield City Personnel Policies and 
Procedures Manual (sic). 
Dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield City 
Appeals Board. Procedures for such appeals are outlined in 
the Richfield City Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual 
(sic). 
Richfield's policies and procedures provide for an appeal to 
the Richfield City Appeals Board. Utah Code Ann. Section 
10-3-1106 is the source of authority for the Appeals Board. 
Section 10-3-1106 (1) specifies in part: 
...he shall have the right to appeal the discharge or 
transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board which 
shall consist of five members, three of whom shall be chosen 
by and from the appointive officers and employees, and two 
of whom shall be members of the governing body. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Consequently, the Respondents have adopted Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 as the precedure by which 
appeals and hearings will be conducted for the marshal and the 
police assistants in the City of Richfield. 
The Court orf Appeals in footnote 4 at page 6 of the 
decision summarily stated that the Richfield City Police 
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Department Policies and Procedures Manual does not pertain to 
the chief of police. However, in its decision the Court of 
Appeals also specifically held that Ward was a member of the 
department. Therefore, there is a significant contradiction in 
the reasoning of the Court. 
A similar matter was addressed by this Court in the case of 
Berube v. Fashion Centref Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989). The 
Berube Case, supra, placed great importance upon a policy and 
procedure manual. The case makes it clear that an employer is 
expected to abide by the terms of its policy manual. Associate 
Chief Justice Howe's concurring opinion, with which Chief 
Justice Hall concurred, states at page 1050: 
I concur only in the results of Parts IV and V deeming it 
not necessary or appropriate here to go beyond the written 
policy manual of the employer, which I view as being part of 
the total employment contract. 
At page 1052, Justice Zimmerman (in his concurring in the 
result opinion) stated: 
In this context, the representations made by the employer in 
employee manuals, bulletins, and the like are legitimate 
sources for determining the apparent intentions of the 
parties. 
In the case at hand, Respondents had enacted the Richfield 
City Police Department Policies and Procedures Manual which 
specifically allowed for appeals of termination. Subparagraph W 
of the Manual states, "Dismissals are subject to appeal to the 
Richfield Appeals board. Procedures for such appeals are 
outlined in the Richfield City Personnel Policies and Procedures 
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Manual (sic)." Ward was an employee of Richfield City. 
Certainly as a member of the police department, as so held by 
the Court of Appeals, he was entitled to an appeal. Thus, any 
employee of Richfield City who is fired has the right to appeal 
to the Richfield City Appeals Board pursuant to procedures 
enacted by the Richfield City Council. The District Court and 
the Court of Appeals were in error in denying Ward the right to 
appeal his termination. Therefore, in addition to the statutory 
right of appeal as set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sections 
10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106, Ward should be entitled to the appeal 
process as created by the Richfield City Police Department 
Policies and Procedures Manual. Consequently, this Court should 
reverse the decision of the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals. 
ISSUE IX 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE INCONSISTENT 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING THE TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER WHICH WAS VIOLATED BY THE RESPONDENTS 
In the Order granting Summary Judgment (Record, pages 386 
and 387), dated September 29, 1986, the District Court provided 
that it would not be in the public interest to disturb the 
actions of Respondents on April 2, and June 8, 1981. However, 
in its Order (Record, pages 391 and 392, a copy of which is in 
the Addendum) dated October 22, 1986, subsequent to the Order 
granting Summary Judgment, the District Court stated as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied, and it is 
specifically ordered that the Temporary Restraining Order 
terminated on June 17, 1981. the date of the first hearing 
before this Court. (Emphasis added.) 
On June 8, 1981, Respondents held their non-scheduled city 
council meeting of which one of the purposes was to terminate 
Ward as chief of police. However, prior to commencing the June 
8, 1981, meeting, the Respondents were served with the Temporary 
Restraining Order prohibiting them from taking any further 
action against Ward* Moreover, the parties stipulated before 
the District Court, as indicated in the statement of facts at 
the beginning of this Brief, as follows: 
11. Respondents, after having been served the Temporary 
Restraining Order, violated the Temporary Restraining Order 
and took action against Ward to terminate him as chief of 
police (Record, page 52). 
It is totally clear that the District Court terminated the 
Temporary Restraining Order on June 17, 1981. Therefore, it was 
in effect on June 8, 1981, and furthermore, as stipulated by the 
parties, it was violated by the Respondents. Consequently the 
actions in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order should 
be voided. 
The District Court certainly has the discretion to grant or 
terminate a temporary restraining order. Nevertheless, once the 
District Court had ruled that the Temporary Restraining Order 
was in effect until June 17, 1981, all actions of the 
Respondents in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order 
should be void ab initio. Richfield City, its mayor, and its 
city council, exist as a result of law enacted by the Utah State 
Legislature. Richfield City would not exist as a municipality 
except for the laws creating the various subdivisions of the 
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State of Utah. Therefore, an entity that exists as a result of 
law, should not only abide by all the requirements of law, but 
it should also abide by all orders issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
Undoubtedly, the Respondents expected the citizens of their 
community to comply with all ordinances and resolutions enacted 
by the Respondents. Furthermore, if.the citizens did not comply 
with duly enacted ordinances, the judicial system would be 
utilized to rule upon any violation of ordinances and the 
consequences thereof. Thus, the municipality itself should be 
expected to comply with all statutes of the State of Utah and 
comply with all orders of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Not only does a municipal body have great power over the 
citizens within its boundaries, but it has a great 
responsibility to uphold the trust of the citizens. There 
should be absolutely no question that a public body would do 
everything possible to comply with law and to set the example 
for the citizens to comply with law and with the orders of the 
judiciary. 
The District Court specifically terminated the Restraining 
Order on June 17, 1981. The Respondents violated the Temporary 
Restraining Order on June 8, 1981. Richfield City and all its 
officials exist as a result of the laws of the State of Utah. 
Consequently, the Respondents should not be allowed to erode the 
legal authority of the District Court by violating a Temporary 
Restraining Order. Respondents should be expected to set an 
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example of complying with law and with court orders. The 
Supreme Court should uphold the judicial authority of the Courts 
to issue a Temporary Restraining Order upon a public body and 
the need for the public body to comply with the Order* 
CONCLUSION 
From the beginning of this controversy, Respondents, without 
notice to the public or an agenda, have consistently handled the 
termination of Ward in a manner without regard to due process, 
requirements of statutes, equal protection or, for that matter, 
without regard to fair play. Respondents initially chose not to 
list on the required agenda that they would consider terminating 
Ward and then they excluded all members of the public from the 
city council meeting to consider the discharge of Ward. 
Thereafter, in the dark of night, Respondents fired Ward. Ward 
requested, in writing, an appeal of that discharge. The appeal 
was completely and totally ignored by Respondents. Ward was 
popular enough to be elected the Sevier County Constable. 
Perhaps Respondents were fearful that the public in a regularly 
scheduled city council meeting with an adequate agenda would 
object to the discharge of Ward or that an appeal board would 
refuse to uphold the termination of Ward. 
The Respondents are composed of the following entities: a 
municipal corporation, mayor, city council, and individual 
councilmen. These entities and individuals represent all of the 
people in the community. The Respondents have the power to 
exercise great control over the lives of the people whom they 
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represent. Respondents have power to enact ordinances, levy 
taxes, and take other actions which directly affect the 
citizens. Surely the Repondents expect the citizens to comply 
with and honor the actions taken by city officials. Why then 
should Respondents not be expected to comply with all laws and 
judicial directives to which they are subject? The Respondents 
should be the most stalwart example of honoring, obeying, and 
upholding the laws of the State of Utah and the directives of 
the District Court. In this case, Respondents not only violated 
the laws of the State of Utah, but they have defied and violated 
a Temporary Restraining Order issued by the District Court. 
The Supreme Court has before it the stipulated facts of the 
parties. These facts are sufficient for the Court to rule in 
favor of Ward. This is the third time these issues have come 
before this Court, and Ward respectfully prays that this Court 
grant him the relief that he has sought diligently for such a 
long period of time. 
Ward prays that this Court will award him the following 
relief: 
1. Declare the actions of Respondents terminating Ward as 
marshal on April 2, 1981, to be in violation of the Utah Open 
and Public Meetings Act and therefore void ab initio; 
2. Declare the actions of Respondents in attempting to 
ratify the termination of Ward of June 8, 1981 , in the 
unscheduled city council meeting to be in violation of the 
Temporary Restraining Order and therefore void ab initio; 
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3. Reverse the Order of the District Court granting 
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and reverse the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming that Order; 
4« Reinstate Ward as chief of police and declare the 
actions of Respondents on April 2, 1981, and June 8, 1981, to be 
void ab initio; 
5. Award back pay, back employment benefits, and general 
damages to Ward; 
6* Award exemplary and punitive damages to Ward as prayed 
for in his complaint; 
7. Award attorney fees, costs, and all other relief to 
Ward as the Supreme Court deems appropriate; 
8. In the alternative, if the Supreme Court determines 
that Ward was legally fired, declare that Ward as a marshal in a 
third class city is entitled to a hearing to appeal his 
termination pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and 
10-3-1106 (1953) and/or the Richfield City Police Department 
Policies and Procedures Manual, with the following provisions: 
a. Reinstate Ward as marshal with back pay, back 
benefit, and general damages until Respondents provide Ward an 
appeal hearing; 
b. Award exemplary and punitive damages to Ward; 
c. Award attorney fees, costs, and other relief to 
Ward as this Court deems appropriate; 
9. Direct the District Court to take all actions necessary 
to carry out and enforce the decision of this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of December, 1989. 
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DISTRICT COURT ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AUD FOR SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD A, WARD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal 
Corporation, et al. 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiff and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgments 
on stipulated facts came before the Court on July 30, 1986. 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied. The Defendant's 
Objection to Bill of Costs is Denied, except for the amount of the 
cash bond which has been returned by Court Order to Plaintiff. 
The Court finds that in accordance with 10-6-32 UCA, the law in 
effect at the time of this case* the term of the Chief of Police of a 
Third Class City shall be until the municipal election next following 
his appointment, unless sooner removed by the Mayor with the concurrence 
of a majority of members of the City Council, or by the City Council witt 
the concurrence of the mayor. 
The Court finds that Richfield City called a public meeting; 
that the agenda delivered to the news media did not have on it any 
Information concerning the termination of the Police Chief; that the 
City Council went into executive session during the publLc meeting 
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and later reconvened to announce the Police Chief termination. 
Section 52-4-3 UCA provides that meetings should be open to 
the public. Section 52-4-8 provides that any final action taken in vio-
lation of Section 52-4-3 and Section 52-4-6 is voidable by a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
The absence of an item of business on the Agenda does not preclude 
its consideration. The "sunshine law" 52-4-1 UCA etc., provides that 
meetings are open to the public. The agenda is to be delivered to the 
news media. The penalty for violation is voidable by a Court of competent 
jurisdiction. Tie act does not establish any right to be heard or to 
participate in debate, or to be represented by witnesses or legal council. 
The purpose of the act is informational in its objective and does not 
provide a procedural process for persons affected by legislative acts 
of the Council except as above stated. 
The Court finds that it would not be in the public interest to 
void the action taken by the Richfield City Council on April 2, 1981, and 
as ratified by it in a June 8f 1981 meeting. 
The only issue the Plaintiff in this case could litigate is whether 
or not the Mayor and Counsel voted to terminate him, and the affidavits 
filed in this case conclusively stated they did and they thereby dispose 
of that issue. 
The Court finds that the dismissal was not malicious or in wanton 
disregard of Plaintiff's rights. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND^R SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD A. WARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHFIELD CITY, 
a municipal corporation, et al 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 8626 
The Plaintiff and his attorney, George E. Brown, Jr., and 
the attorney for defendants, Ken Chamberlain, appeared before 
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs on the 30th day of July, 1986. The 
Court, having reviewed the plaintiffs Motion for Change of 
Venue, the plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and 
the plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, arguments having been 
made, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff 's Motion for Change 
of Venue is denied. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED chat the plaintiff's .Motion to Amend 
the Complaint is granted subject to the defendant *s right to 
provide further opposing argument in the event that the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. since the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment addresses the new cause 
of action contained in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the 
granting of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will 
result in judgment against the plaintiff on all causes of action 
contained in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction is denied, and it is specifically ordered 
that the Temporary Restraining Order terminated on June 17, 
1981, the date of the first hearing before this Court. 
DATED this ^ 2-day of O c ^ t l U M , 1986. 
COURT: 
I hereby certify that I ma-iled a true and cornect copy of 
the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, on this ^ t^\day of 
October, 1986, to the following individual: 
Ken Chamberlain 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, UT 84701 
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DAVIDSON, Judge: 
This appeal concerns whether appellant, Boyd Ward, was 
properly dismissed as Richfield City Chief of Police. Ward 
claimed below that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act was 
violated, that the Richfield City Council disregarded a 
temporary restraining order by taking further subsequent 
action to dismiss him as Chief of Police, and that his request 
for an administrative appeal was improperly deni.ed. The trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Richfield City. We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council held a public 
meeting after publishing an agenda as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 52-4-6 (1981). The agenda did not list Ward's 
discharge as Chief of Police. Following discussion of items 
on the agenda, the Council voted to hold a closed meeting and 
invited Ward to join them in discussing his position as Chief 
of Police* The Council was concerned about several recent 
resignations within the police department. Discussion of 
Ward's termination ensued and the Council decided to terminate 
Ward. The Council resumed open session and formally voted to 
discharge Ward effective April 3, 1981. 
On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted a written request to the 
Council for an administrative appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 10-3-1105 and -1106 (1981). The request was denied. On 
June 5, 1981, the Council published notice that a special 
meeting would be held on June 8, 1981# to ratify its actions 
taken at the April meeting. The Council published an agenda 
that included Ward's discharge as an item for discussion. 
Prior to the meeting, Ward served the Council with a temporary 
restraining order, to restrain it from taking any further 
action against hinf. Despite the temporary restraining order, 
the Council ratified its decision to terminate Ward. 
On June 17, 1981, the trial court held a preliminary 
injunction hearing and determined that pursuant to the removal 
statute for chiefs of police, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-911 
(repealed 1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
Section 10-3-911 stated in part that "[t]he chief of police or 
fire department of the cities may at any time be removed, 
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to be heard, by the 
board of commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of the 
service will be served thereby." 
Ward appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah 
Supreme Court and the court decided in Ward v. Richfield Citv, 
716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984), that the trial court did have 
jurisdiction because section 10-3-911 did not pertain to third 
class cities. The case was remanded to the trial court. On 
remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Richfield City. The court ruled that although the agenda for 
the April 2, 1981 meeting did not include the termination of 
Ward as Chief of Police, nevertheless, it was not in the public 
interest to void the Council's action at either the April 2 or 
the June 8 meeting. 
Ward contends on appeal that: (1) the Council violated the 
Utah Open and Public. Meetings Act in the April 2, 1981 meeting; 
(2) the Council, on June 8, 1981, acted in violation of the 
temporary restraining order; (3) the Council wrongfully denied 
him the right to appeal his discharge; (4) the trial court 
erroneously applied the law in granting summary judgment in 
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favor of Richfield City; and (5) he is entitled to 
reinstatement, back pay and damages. 
UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT 
We first examine whether the Council violated the Utah Open 
and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann, §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981), 
at the April 2, 1981 meeting and if so, whether the June 8 
meeting cured any such violation. The purpose of the Utah Open 
and Public Meetings Act is to ensure that the actions of the 
state, its agencies, and political subdivisions are conducted 
openly, fififi Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv. Comm'n. 
598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979), Political subdivisions, as defined 
in Utah Code Ann, § 10-1-201 (1981), include municipal 
corporations and municipalities. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-601 
(1981) provides that all meetings of the governing body of each 
municipality shall be held in compliance with the provisions of 
the open and public meetings law. 
Ward contends that Richfield City failed to comply with the 
agenda and notice provisions of the open meetings law and that 
such failure should void the action taken at the April 
meeting. Ward argues that the subject of his discharge should 
have been listed on the agenda, even if discussions regarding 
him were conducted in a closed meeting. This contention fails 
for two reasons. First, the open meetings act designates 
certain subjects which are exempt from discussion in open 
meetings. See section 52-4-5. Where at least two-thirds of 
the public body present at an open meeting vote to hold a 
closed meeting to discuss the character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health of an individual, then 
a closed meeting may be held. See section 52-4-4. The Council 
voted in the April open meeting to sequester themselves to 
discuss Ward's professional competence in compliance with 
section 52-4-4. The Council concluded the closed meeting with 
a unanimous vote, one member abstaining, to discharge Ward. 
Minutes of the closed meeting were recorded and when the 
Council resumed open session, a formal vote to discharge Ward 
was taken.1 
1. Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether 
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session resumed. 
Most of those present were members of the media and they 
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, but 
wanted to be advised if action were taken. 
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Second, even if technical violations had occurred in the 
April meeting, they were subsequently cured. On June 5, notice 
of the special session scheduled for June 8 was provided to the 
local newspaper and the radio station in compliance with the 
agenda and notice provisions of section 52-4-6(3). The agenda 
for the June 8 meeting included Ward's discharge and the media 
was notified more than twenty-four hours in advance. At the 
June meeting, the Council voted without opposition to ratify 
its actions taken at the April meeting. Ward argues that the 
action taken at the June meeting violated the temporary 
restraining order.2 The order restrained the Council from 
taking any further action against him. Richfield City argues 
that the June meeting merely ratified action that had already 
been taken and, therefore, was not new action. 
In a oroceedina for violation of an iniunction. it is 
generally neia tnat tne extent or tne pumsnment rests in tne 
sound discretion of the court. See Hensley v. Board of 
Education. 210 Kan. 858, 504 P.2d 184, 189 (1972); People v. 
Mulorew, 19 111. App. 3d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1974). -The 
inherent power of a court rendering a permanent injunction to 
enforce its decree and to modify or revoke the injunction for 
equitable reasons due to changed conditions is generally 
recognized . . . ." Mulcrrew, 311 N.E.2d at 382. The trial 
court held that it was not in the public's best interest to 
void the action taken by the Council in terminating Ward. We 
will not disturb judgments in injunction proceedings that rest 
within the sound discretion of the trier of facts, unless an 
abuse of discretion clearly appears from the record. See 
Hensley, 504 P.2d at 188. 
RIGHT TO APPEAL DISCHARGE 
The Mayor, with the advice and consent of the Council, 
appointed Ward to the position of Richfield City Chief of 
Police, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-916 (1981). This 
same body had the authority to dismiss Ward, without a hearing, 
notice, or cause. In Hutchison v. Cartwriqht, 692 P.2d 772, 
773-774 (Utah 1984), the court held that unless otherwise 
controlled by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is 
2. Ward asserts that he would have mobilized supporters had he 
known the Council planned on taking action despite the 
temporary restraining order. However, the council was under no 
duty to notify Ward personally of its intended action. 
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appurtenant to the power to appoint. -When an individual is 
appointed by an official, 'the office is held during the 
pleasure of the authority making the appointment, and . . . no 
notice or charges or hearings are required for the suspension 
or removal by the authority appointing the officer.•" I£. at 
774 (quoting Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of Comm'rs, 
71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783, 784 (1928)). "The rule of common law 
was that the appointment to municipal office carried with it no 
vested property interest in continued employment, and such 
officers were subject to removal without cause, reason or 
hearing unless otherwise prescribed." Carlson v. Bratton, 681 
P.2d 1333, 1337 (Wyo. 1984). Since the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that section 10-3-911 did not apply, there is not an 
applicable statute explicitly governing the dismissal of chiefs 
of police or city marshals in third class cities.3 
Therefore, based on common law, we conclude that the Mayor and 
the Council had independent authority to discharge Ward, 
without a hearing, notice or cause. 
Ward, nevertheless, contends that he has a right to appeal 
his discharge under sections 10-3-1105 and -1106. Section 
10-3-1105 provides that "[a]11 appointive officers and 
employees of municipalities, other than members of the police 
departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and 
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation 
of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only ££L 
hereinafter provided." (Emphasis added.) Ward argues that he 
does not fall within the exception because he is not a member 
of a "police department" per se, but a city marshal with 
appointed assistants. However, we read sections 10-3-1105 and 
-1106 as specifically excluding him. Other sections in chapter 
10 use the term "chief of police" interchangeably with "city 
marshal." See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918 (1986). As 
3. Ward contends that the trial court erroneously applied Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-6-32 which was repealed in 1977. This section 
provided for the term of employment and removal of appointed 
officers, without cause, in first, second and third class 
cities. This section was not replaced with a statute expressly 
directing the removal of chiefs of police in third class 
cities. However, in light of our analysis that Ward does not 
have a right to appeal and that he can be removed without 
cause, we find that the trial court, nevertheless, reached the 
correct result. Therefore, the trial court's application of 
section 10-6-32 was harmless error. 
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Chief of Police, we hold that Ward is both a member of a 
"police department- and the head of that "department." 
Ward also argues that even if he falls within the 
exception to section 10-3-1105 because he is a chief of 
police, nevertheless, the language in the second sentence of 
section 10-3-1106 applies to "any officer." Because these 
sections must be read together and should harmonize with the 
purpose of the whole act, Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care. 
IHSL»., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), we hold that the language 
"as hereinafter provided" in section 10-3-1105 specifically 
modifies the sections that follow. "Separate parts of [an] 
act should not be construed in isolation from the rest of the 
act.- Id. Saa ALaa Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d 
480, 481 (Utah 1980). Therefore, "any officer" as appears in 
section 10-3-1106 must mean any officer not excluded in 
section 10-3-1105. 
Our holding is in keeping with the rationale behind the 
power to discharge a chief of police without a hearing, 
notice, or cause. Since the chief of police is appointed to 
carry out the policies of the mayor "[t]he position of chief 
of police is clearly recognized as different than that of any 
other position in the police department for the obvious reason 
that the chief of police is in a position of making and 
carrying out policy for the mayor." Carlson, 681 P.2d at 
1335. The result is there is no protected property interest 
in the position of chief of police. I&. at 1337.4 
4. Ward contends that he has a right to appeal under the 
"Richfield City Police Department Policies and Procedures 
Manual." The pertinent sections of the manual provide that a 
member of the department may request a review of disciplinary 
action by submitting a written request to the chief of police 
and that dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield 
City Appeals Board. However, these sections specifically 
pertain to officers under the supervision of the chief of 
police and not to the chief himself. 
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The sununary judgment is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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June 14, 1989 OPINION 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted/ and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises/ it is now 
ordered/ adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the District 
Court herein be, and the same is/ affirmed. 
Opinion of the Court by RICHARD C. DAVIDSON/ Judge; JUDITH M. 
BILLINGS and REGNAL W. GARFF, Judges, concur. 
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DATED this July, 198! 
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STATUTES 
(IN NUMERICAL ORDER) 
.AH CODE Cities and Towns 10-3-917. 
the second class shall be an office of record for all 
maps, plans, plats, profiles, drawings, final estim-
ates, specifications and contracts which in any way 
relate to the public improvements and engineering 
affairs of the city. The city engineer shall be custo-
dian of all drawings and documents above menti-
oned, im 
10-3-904c Books and supplies - Recording, filing 
gnd Inspection. 
The city engineer's office shall be supplied with 
aII necessary books, cases and supplies for recording 
and filing as required. The city engineer shall record 
and file all drawings and documents pertaining to 
public lands and improvements. Those made in his 
office shall be placed on record as soon as compl-
eted and shall then be open for public inspections, 
and any person copying the same or taking notes 
therefrom may do so in pencil only. He shall keep 
the records and files in good condition and turn the 
same o^cr to his successor in office. He shall allow 
no alteration, mutilation or changes to be made in 
any matter of record, and shall be held strictly acc-
ountable for the same. \m 
10-3-905° Fees to be paid in advance. 
The city engineer shall not record any drawings or 
instruments, or file any papers or notices, or furnish 
any copies, or render any service connected with his 
office, until the fees for the same are paid or tend-
ered as prescribed by law or ordinance. \m 
10-3-906. Seal. 
The city engineer shall be provided with a seal by 
(he city for his use, containing the words # 
City, Utah, Engineering Department*. The seal shall 
be affixed to every certification approval. tm 
10-3-907. Recordation not to interfere with other 
recordation. 
The recording or filing of any drawing or instru-
ment in the city engineer's office shall not interfere 
or conflict in any way with the recording or filing of 
the same in other offices of record. \m 
10-3-906. Noncompliance a misdemeanor. 
Any city engineer who fails to comply with sect-
ions 10-3-903 through 10-3-907 is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. ICT 
10-3-909. Police and fire departments in cities of 
(he first and second class. 
The board of city commissioners or other gover-
ning body of each city of the first or the second 
class shall create, support, maintain and control a 
police department and may create, support, main-
tain and control a fire department in their respective 
cities. ifTf 
10-3-910. Heads of departments and subordinate 
officers. 
The administration of the police and fire depart-
ments shall consist of a chief of the department and 
such officers, members, employees and agents as the 
board of commissioners may by ordinance prescribe, 
».*nd Lhe-board of commissioners shall-appoint^ the 
heads of such departments. im 
10-3-911. Removal of departmental heads. 
The chief of the police or fire department of the 
c,i«es may at any time be removed, without a trial, 
"caring or opportunity to be heard, by the board of 
commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of 
ln
« service will be served thereby. Its action in j 
'^moving the chief of either department shall be | 
"nal and conclusive and shall not be received or j 
ca
*led in question before any court. The city rcco- I 
r£cr shall forthwith notify in writing the removed 
c
«ief of his removal, and it shall not be necessary to 
state any cause for removal. From the time of not-
ification the person removed shall not in any case be 
entitled to any salary or compensation. irn 
10-3-912. Department heads may suspend 
subordinates. 
The chief of each department may at any time 
suspend any subordinate officers, member, empl-
oyee or agent employed therein when in his judg-
ment the good of the service demands it, for a 
period of time not exceeding 15 days,, and during 
the time of suspension the person suspended shall 
not be entitled to any salary or compensation wha-
tsoever. \rn 
10*3-913. Powers and duties of chief of police. 
The chief of police shall, in the discharge of his 
duties, have the same powers, responsibilities as 
sheriffs and constables; he shall suppress riots, dis-
turbances and breaches of the peace, and apprehend 
all persons committing any offense against the laws 
of the state or the ordinances of the city. He shall at 
all times diligently and faithfully discharge his duties 
and enforce all ordinances and regulations of the 
city for the preservation of peace, good order and 
the protection of the rights and property of all 
persons. \m 
10-3-914. Police officers - Powers and duties. 
The police officers of any municipality shall have 
the same powers and responsibilities as constables. 
It shall be the duty of the police force in any mun-
icipality at all times to preserve the public peace, 
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress 
riots, protect persons and property, remove nuisa-
nces existing in the public streets, roads and high-
ways, enforce every law relating to the suppression 
of offenses, and perform all duties required of them 
by ordinance or resolution. \m 
10-3-915c Rights to arrest without warrant. 
Thejnembers of the police force shall have the 
power and authority, without process, to arrest and 
take into custody any person who shall commit or 
threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of the 
officer, or within his view, any breach of the peace, 
or any offense directly prohibited by the laws of this 
state or by ordinance. \m 
10-3-916. Recorder, treasurer, marshal in cities of 
third class and towns. 
In each city of the third class and town on or 
before the first Monday in February following a 
municipal election the mayor, with the advice and 
consent of the city council, shall appoint a qualified 
person to each of the offices of city recorder, trea-
surer, and marshal. The city recorder shall be ex 
officio the city auditor and shall perfoirm the duties 
of such office. The mayor, with the advice and 
consent of the council, may also appoint and fill 
vacancies in all such officers and agents as may be 
provided for by law or ordinance, except as is oth-
erwise provided by law. All officers shall continue in 
I office until their successors are. appointed and qua-
lified, i w 
10-3-917. Engineer in cities of the third class and 
towns. 
The governing body of cities of the third class and 
towns may by ordinance establish the office of 
municipal engineer and prescribe the duties and 
obligations for that office which are consistent with 
the duties and obligations of the city engineer in 
cities of the first and second class. Where a city of 
the third class or town uses the engineer employed 
by the county in which the municipality is located, 
the municipality may, by ordinance prescribe for its 
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10-3-918. Cities and 
municipal engineer either the duties of a municipal 
engineer or, if different, the duties of the county 
engineer, or a combination of duties. irn 
10-3-9IS. Chief of police or marshal in third class 
cities and towns. 
In cities of the third class and towns, the chief of 
police or marshal shall exercise and perform such 
duties as may be prescribed by the governing body. 
The chief of police or marshal shall be under the 
direction, control and supervision of the mayor. The 
chief of police or marshal may with the consent of 
the mayor, appoint assistants to the chief of police 
or marshal. i w 
10-3-919. Powers, duties and obligations of 
police chief, marshal and their assistants in cities 
of the third class and towns. 
The chief of police, marshals and their assistants 
in cities of the third class and towns shall have all of 
the powers, rights and duties respectively conferred 
on such officers in sections 10-3-913 through 10-
3-915. \m 
10-3*920. Bail commissioner - Powers and 
duties. 
The mayor of any city of the third class, with the 
advice and consent of the city council, and the 
board of commissioners in other cities, may appoint 
from among the officers and members of the police 
department of the city one or more discreet persons 
to be known as bail commissioners, who shall have 
and exercise all the powers which are now or here-
after may be conferred by law upon justices of the 
peace or judges of the circuit court in respect to the 
fixing of bail of persons arrested within the corpo-
rate limits of the city for misdemeanors under the 
laws of the state or for violation of the city ordin-
ances, and to the takirig and the approving of the 
same. Any person who has been ordered by any 
such bail commissioner to give bail may deposit the 
amount thereof in money with such bail commissi-
oner. 1913 
10-3-921. Fines - Collection by bail 
commissioner - Accounting. 
In addition to their duties in respect to the fixing 
of bail, bail commissioners shall have power on 
nonjudicial days, and after the hour of 5 o'clock 
p.m. and before the hour of 9 o'clock a.m. on 
judicial days, to collect and receipt for moneys 
tendered in payment of the fine of any person 
serving sentence in default of the payment of such 
fine. All moneys collected by bail commissioners 
shall be accounted for at least once a month to the 
clerk of the circuit court in cities where a municipal 
department of the circuit court exists, and in cities 
where such department does not exist such accoun-
ting shall be made to the city treasurer, or in cases 
arising under the state laws to the county treasurer. 
1*77 
10-3-922. Term of bail commissioners • Salary 
• Boud and oath. 
Commissioners appointed under this article shall 
serve at the pleasure of the governing body or 
mayor appointing them, and shall receive no com-
pensation as such. Before entering upon their dunes 
as bail commissioners they shall take and subscribe 
an oath to faithfully and impartially discharge the 
duties of their office, and shall give bond to the city 
wherein they are appointed, with two good and 
sufficient individual sureties or with a single corpo-
rate surety, to be approved by the governing body 
or mayor appointing them, which bond shall be in 
the sum of $2,500, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of their duties as such commissioners, 
and that they will well and truly account for and 
turn over to the clerk of the circuit court or to the 
treasurer of their respective cities or counties, as the 
case may be. at such times as may be designated by 
the governing body of the city, all moneys, bonds, 
properly and records coming into their hands as 
such commissioners, and that at the expiration of 
their term of office they will surrender and turn 
over as aforesaid all funds, bonds, properly, papers 
and records then in their hands pertaining to their 
respective offices. Suit upon any such bond may be 
brought by any county, city or person injured. \m 
10-3-923. City and town justices of the peace -
Appointment - Vacancies • Disqualification -
Compensation • Payment of fees, fines, 
forfeitures or other sums to treasurer. 
(1) Each municipality which does not have a 
municipal department of the circuit court may, IQ 
the manner it appoints other officers, appoint a 
justice of the peace. Justices of the peace shall be 
appointed to terms of four years beginning the first 
Monday in February, 1980, provided that justices 
now holding office or appointed to fill any vacancy 
shall hold office until the successor is duly appoi-
nted and qualified. Municipal justice* of the peace 
may be removed from office in the same manner as 
county justices. 
(2) If a vacancy shall occur in the office of a 
municipal justice, the mayor or town president, by 
and with the consent of the governing body, shall 
forthwith fill such vacancy by appointment for the 
unexpired term The person appointed shall qualify 
in the same manner as a municipal justice, and shall 
have and exercise all the powers conferred by law 
upon such municipal justice In case any municipal 
justice shall for any reason be unable or disqualified 
to perform the duties of his office, or shall be 
absent, the mayor or town president shall appoint 
some other justice of the peace residing within the 
county to act as the municipal justice of the peace 
pro tempore, and he shall have and discharge the 
duties of [sic] such municipal justice might have, but 
during the existence of such disability or absence 
only 
(3) The salary of the municipal justices of the 
peace shall be set by ordinance in the manner pres-
cribed by section 78-5-29 
(4) All fees, fines, forfeitures or any other sums 
collected by the justice of the peace shall be paid to 
the municipal treasurer within seven days of receipt. 
(5) Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of a 
municipal justice of the peace, the municipality may 
contract with the county or another municipality to 
share the services of a justice. The contract shall be 
for the same term as the term of the justice whose 
services are sought Municipalities may contract for 
the services of a county or municipal justice during 
their entire term at any time there is a vacancy in 
the office of municipal justice. Vacancies may be 
created by refusing to reappoint a person to the 
office of justice of the peace. \m 
10-3-924. Appointment of manager. 
The governing body of any city or town may by 
ordinance establish a manager form of government 
and appoint any person to be known as the 
manager \m 
10-3-925. Term of office. 
The manager shall serve at the pleasure of the 
governing body except that the governing body may 
employ the manager for a term not to exceed three 
years. The term of employment may be renewed at 
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any time. Any person serving as manager of a 
municipality under (his section may be removed with 
or without cause by a majority vote of the gover-
ning body. 1977 
10-3-926. Duties of the manager. 
The governing body shall, by ordinance or resol-
ution, prescribe the powers, duties and obligations 
of the manager. 1*77 
10°3-927. Legislative powers and official position 
of the mayor not delegated. 
The legislative and judicial powers of the mayor, 
his position as chairman of the governing body and 
any ex officio position the mayor shall hold shall 
not be delegated to the manager. i*77 
10-3-92*. Attorney. 
The city attorney shall have the duty to prosecute 
violations o f city ordinances and shall have the same 
powers in respect to violations o f city ordinances as 
may be exercised by a county attorney in respect to 
violations o f state law, including, but not limited to , 
granting immunity to witnesses for violations of city 
ordinances. i»77 
Part 10. Civil Service Commission 
10-3-1001. Subordlnants in police, health, and fire 
departments to be appointed from list. 
10-3-1002. Classified civil service - Employment 
constituting. 
10-3-1003. Commission - Number, term, vacancies. 
10-3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners - Salary -
Removal. 
10-3-1005. Organization of commission - Secretary -
Offices, 
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations . Printing and 
distribution. 
10-3-1007. Examinations. 
10-3-1008. Appointments from civil service list -
Probation period. 
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position • 
Number - Eligible lists* removal. 
10-3-1010. Promotions • Rasas - Certification of 
applicants. 
10-3-1011. Temporary employees. 
10-3-1012. Discharge by department head - Appeal to 
commission - Hearing and decision. 
10-3-1013. Annual and special reports by commission. 
10-3-100L Subordinates in police, health, and 
fire departments to be appointed from list. 
The head of each of the police and fire departm-
ents o f cities o f the first and second class and the 
health officer in cities o f the first class shall, by and 
with the advice and consent o f the board of city 
commissioners, and subject to the rules and regula-
tions of the civil service commission, appoint from 
the classified civil service list furnished by the civil 
service commission all subordinate officers, emplo-
yees, members or agents in his department, and in 
like manner fill all vacancies in the same. i»77 
10-3-1002. Classified civil service - Employment 
constituting. 
The classified civil service shall consist of all 
places of employment now existing or hereafter 
created in or under the police department and the 
fire department of each city o f the first and second 
class, and the health department in cities of the first 
class, except the head of the departments, deputy 
chiefs o f the police and fire departments and assis-
tant chiefs of the police department in cities o f the 
first and second class, and the members of the 
board o f health of the departments. No appointm-
ents to any of the places of employment constituting 
the classified civil service in the departments shall be 
made except according to law and under the rules 
and regulations of the civil service commiss ion. The 
head of each of the departments may, and the 
deputy chiefs of the police and fire departments and 
assistant chiefs of the police department shall, be 
appointed from the classified civil service, and upon 
the expiration o f his term or upon the appointment 
of a successor shall be returned ihercto. im 
10-3-1003. Commission - Ntiml^ er, term, 
vacancies. 
In each city of the first and second class there 
shall be a civil service commission, consisting of 
three members appointed by the board of commis-
sioners. Their term of office shall be six years, but 
they shall be appointed so that the term of office of 
one member shall expire on <he 30th day of June of 
each even-numbered year. If a vacancy occurs in 
the civil service commission, it shall be filled by 
appointment by the board of city commissioners for 
the unexpired term. \m 
10-3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners 
Salary - Removal. 
Not more than two members of the civil service 
commission shall at any one lime be of the same 
political party. No member of the civil service 
commission shall during his tenure of office hold 
any other public office, or be a candidate for any 
other public office. Each member shall receive $25 
for each meeting of the commission which he shall 
attend, but shall not receive more than SI00 in any 
one month. In case of misconduct, inability or 
willful neglect in the performance of the duties of 
the office by any member, the member may be 
removed from office by the board of city commiss-
ioners by a majority vote of the entire membership, 
but the member shall, if he so desires, have the 
opportunity to be heard in defense. \m 
10-3-1005. Organization of commission -
Secretary - Offices. 
The civil service commissnon shall organize by 
selecting one of its members chairman, and shall 
appoint as secretary one of the available officers or 
employees of the city, who shall act and serve 
without additional compensation. The secretary shall 
keep a record of all meetings of the civil service 
commission and of its work and shall perform such 
other services as the commission may require, and 
shall have the custody of the books and records of 
the commission. The board of city commissioners 
shall provide suitable accomodations and equipment 
to enable the civil service commission to attend to 
its business. \m 
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations - Printing and 
distribution. 
The civil service commission shall make all nece-
ssary rules and regulations to carry out the purposes 
of this part and for examinations, appointments and 
promotions. All rules and regulations shall be 
printed by the civil service commission for distrib-
ution. I»77 
10-3-1007. Examinations. 
All applicants for employment in the classified 
civil service shall be subject to examination, which 
shall be public, competitive and free. Examinations 
shall be held at such times and places as the civil 
service commission shall from time to time deter-
mine, and shall be for the purpose of determining 
the qualifications of applicants for positions. Exa-
minations shall be practical and shall fairly test the 
fitness in every respect of the persons examined to 
discharge the duties of the positions to which they 
Code • Co 
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seek to be appointed, and shall include tests of 
physical qualifications and health. \m 
10-3-1008. Appointments from civil service list -
Probation period. 
In all cases the appointing power shall notify the 
civil service commission of each separate position to 
be filled, and shall fill such place by the appoint-
ment of one of the persons certified by the commi-
ssion therefor. Such appointment shall be on prob-
ation, and of a character and for a period to be 
prescribed by the civil service commission. \m 
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position 
• Number • Eligible lists, removal. 
Whenever a position in the classified civil service 
is to be filled, the civil service commission shall as 
soon as possible certify to the appointing power the 
names of Vive persons to fill such position from 
those persons having the highest standing in the 
eligible list but a lesser number may be certified 
when there is not the required number on the elig-
ible list. If more than one position is available in the 
same department, the civil service commission shall 
also certify to the appointing power one additional 
name for each additional position to be filled. All 
persons not appointed shall be restored to their rel-
ative positions on the eligible list. All persons who 
have been on the eligible list for two years without 
appointment shall be removed therefrom and can 
only be returned thereto upon regular examination. 
1913 
10-3-1010. Promotions - Basis - Certification 
of applicants. 
The civil service commission shall provide for 
promotion in the classified civil service on the basis 
of ascertained merit, seniority in service and stan-
ding obtained by competitive examination, and shall 
provide, in all cases where practicable, that vacan-
cies shall be filled by promotion from the members 
of the next tower rank as submit themselves for the 
examination aod promotion. The civil service com-
mission shall certify to the appointing power the 
names of not more than five applicants having the 
highest rating for each promotion. IWJ 
10-3-1011. Temporary employees. 
The head of each department, with the advice and 
consent of the board of city commissioners, may 
employ any person for temporary work only, 
without making the appointment from the certified 
list, but the appointment shall not be longer than 
one month in the same calendar year, and under no 
circumstances shall the temporary employee be 
appointed to a permanent position unless he shall 
have been duly certified by the civil service commi-
ssion as in other cases. \m 
10-3-1012. Discharge by department head -
Appeal to commission • Hearing and decision. 
All persons in the classified civil service may be 
removed from office or employment by the head of 
the department for misconduct, incompetency or 
failure to perform his duties or failure to observe 
properly the rules of the department, but subject to 
appeal by the discharged person to the civil service 
commission. Any person discharged may, within 
five days from the issuing by the head of the depa-
rtment of the order discharging him, appeal there-
from to the civil service commission, which shall 
fully hear and determine the matter. The discharged 
person shall be entitled to appear in person and to 
have counsel and a public hearing. The finding and 
decision of the civil service commission upon the 
hearing shall be certified to the head of the depart-
ment from whose order the appeal is taken, and 
shall be final, and shall forthwith be enforced and 
followed by him. tfrr 
10-3-1013. Annual and special reports b> 
commission. 
The civil service commission shall in December of 
each year make an annual report to the board of 
city commissioners and shall make as many special 
reports as the board of city commissioners shall 
request. i*n 
Part 11. Personnel Rules and Benefits 
10-3-110! through 10-3-U02. Repelled. 
10-3-1103. Sickness, disability and detlh benefits. 
10-3-1104. Library personnel • Monthly wage 
deductions and matching sums - Time of inclusion. 
10-3-1105. Appointive officer* and employees • 
Duration and termination of term of office. 
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer • Appeals • Board • 
Procedure. 
10-3-1107. Cost of living adjustment • Price index used. 
10-3-1101 through 10-3-1102. Repealed. t*J 
10-3-1103. Sickness, disability and death benefits. 
(1) The governing body of each municipality may 
maintain as to ail elective or appointive officers and 
employees, including heads of departments, a system 
for the payment of health, dental, hospital, medical, 
disability and death benefits to be financed and 
administered in a manner and payable upon the 
terms and conditions as the governing body of the 
municipality may by ordinance or resolution presc-
ribe 
(2) The governing bodies of the municipalities 
may create and administer personnel benefit prog-
rams separately or jointly with other municipalities 
or other political subdivisions of the State of Utah 
or associations thereof. im 
10-3-1104. Library personnel • Monthly wage 
deductions and matching sums - Time of 
inclusion. 
(1) The librarians, assistants and employees of any 
public library may, at the discretion of (he board o( 
directors of the library, be included within and 
participate in the pension, retirement, sickness, dis-
ability and death benefit svstem established under 
section 10-3-1103. In the event the librarian, 
assistants and employees of the municipality are 
included within and participate in the system, there 
shall be deducted from the monthly wage or salary 
of the librarian, assistants and employees and paid 
into the system, a percentage of their wage or salary 
equal to the percentage of the monthly wage or 
salary of other employees of the municipality which 
is paid into the system. Also there shall be paid 
monthly into the system from the funds of the 
library a further sum equal (o the total amount 
deducted monthly from the wage or salary of the 
librarian, assistants and employees and paid into the 
retirement system. 
(2) Where the election by the board of directors 
of any library for inclusion of its librarian, assist-
ants and employees within the system of any muni-
cipality is subsequent to the establishment of the 
system, the inclusion ma.y begin as of the date of the 
establishment of the svstem or as of the date of the 
election as shall be determined b> the board of dir-
ectors. If inclusion is as of the date o\ the establis-
hment of the system, there shall be paid into the 
system in addition to the subsequent monthly wage 
deductions and matching sums, a sum equal to the 
aggregate o( monthly pas roll deductions and matc-
hing sums that would have accrued during the 
period beginning with the establishment of the 
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swcm and ending with the election had the libra-
rian, assistants and employees been included within 
fhe system from its establishment IITT 
10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees -
Duration and termination of term of office. 
Ail appointive officers and employees of munici-
palities, other than members of the police depart-
ments, fire departments, heads of departments, and 
superintendents, shall hold their employment 
viiihout limitation of time, being subject to disch-
arge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided irn 
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer - Appeals -
Board - Procedure. 
(1) No officer or employee covered by section 10-
M105 shall be discharged or transferred to a 
position with less remuneration because of his poli-
tics or religious belief, or incident to, or through 
changes, either in the elective officers, governing 
bodv. or heads of departments. In all cases where 
am officer or employee is discharged or transferred 
from one position to another for any reason, he 
shall have the right to appeal the discharge or tran-
sfer to a board to be known as the appeal board 
which shall consist of five members, three of whom 
shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers 
and employees, and two of whom shall be members 
of the governing body 
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written 
notice of the appeal with the recorder within ten 
da\s after the discharge or transfer Upon the filing 
of the appeal, the city recorder shall forthwith refer 
a copy of the same to the appeal board Upon 
receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, 
(he appeal board shall forthwith commence its inv-
estigation, take and receive evidence and fully hear 
and determine the matter which relates to the cause 
for the discharge or transfer 
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in 
person and to be represented by counsel, to have a 
public hearing, to confront the witness whose testi-
mony is lo be considered, and to examine the evid-
ence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(4) (n the event the appeal board upholds the 
discharge or transfer, the officer or employee may 
have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing 
bodv whose decision shall be final In the event the 
appeal board does not uphold the discharge or tra-
nsfer the case shall be closed and no further proce-
edings shall be had. 
(5) The decision of the appeal board shall be by 
secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder 
*uh 15 days from the date the matter is referred to 
' The board may, in its decision, provide that an 
•niployee shall receive his salary for the period of 
>me during which he is discharged, or any defici-
*ncv m salary for the period he was transferred to a 
position of less remuneration but not to exceed a 15 
ta\ period. In no case shall the appointive officer or 
'mployee be discharged or transferred, where an 
ippcal is taken, except upon a concurrence of at 
east a majority of the membership of the governing 
Jody of the municipality 
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not 
JPhold the discharge, or transfer, the recorder shall 
cmf> the decision to the employee affected, and 
l
'<o to the head of the department from whose 
)rUer the appeal was taken The employee shall be 
>a
»d his salary, commencing with the next working 
,aN following the certification by the recorder of the 
lPPeal board's decision, provided that the empl 
,vcc or officer, concerned reports for his assigned 
'utics during that next working day 
(7) The method and manner of choosing the 
members of the appeal board, and the designation 
of their terms of office shall be prescribed by the 
go\erning body of each municipality by ordinance, 
but the provisions for choosing the three members 
from the appointed officers and employees shall m 
no way restrict a free selection of members by the 
appointive officers and employees of the municipa-
lity I«TT 
10-3-U07. Cost of living adjustment - Price 
index used. 
(1) The governing body of each municipality may. 
in their discretion, adopt a plan to allow any person 
who qualifies under this part to receive a cost of 
living adjustment in their monthly retirement allo-
wance; but the adjustment allowed shall be a perc-
entage, not to exceed one hundred per cent, of the 
sum as would restore the full purchasing power of 
each person's original unmodified pension allow-
ance as it was in the calendar year in which the 
retirement giving rise to the pension occurred 
(2) The amount necessary to restore trie full pur-
chasing power of the original unmodified pension 
allowance shall be computed from the consumers 
price index published by the United States Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
(3) Adjustments may be effective as of the date of 
this act or at any subsequent date set by the govcr 
nmg body A municipality may choose to pay any 
per cent to the maximum amount provided that such 
percentage be paid to all qualified persons equally 
\m 
Part 12. Alternative Forms of Municipal 
Government 
10-3-1201 Citation of act. 
10-3-1202. Legislative finding 
10-3-120J. Election requirements and procedure for 
organization under optional form of government. 
10-3-1204. Application of act 
10-3-1205. Rights, powers, and duties of municipality 
operating under optional form. 
10-3-1206 Limitation on changing form of government. 
10*3-1207 Disapproval of optional form by voters -
Limitation on resubmission. 
10-3-1209. Election of officers - When new government 
operative • Compensation of officials without position 
in new government 
10-3-1209 Council-mayor and council-manager form 
defined 
10-3-1210 Functions of the council 
10-3-1211 Council members • Qualifications - Terms 
of office. 
10-3-1212. Meetings of council • Access to records. 
10-3-1213. Chairmen of councils • Power to (all 
witnesses and administer oath • Quorum - Voting 
procedure 
10-3-1214. Ordinance adoption under council-mayor 
form - Powers of mayor 
10-3-1215 Rules and regulations for government of 
council. 
10-3-1216. Council members elected from districts -
Boundary - Adjustments. 
t0-3-1217 Limitations on actions and authority of 
council members • Investigatory committees 
10-3-1218 Vacancy in council 
10-3-1219 Council-mayor form • Powers and duties 
of mayor 
IO-3-I2I9 5 Council-mayor form Ordinance* on 
transfer of municipal properly and regulation of 
subdivisions or annexations 
10-3-1220 Council-mayor form • Appointment of 
chief administrative officer 
10-3-1221 Municipal administrative code in 
council-mayor form 
10-3-1222. Council-mayor form V acano in office of 
mayor 
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justify when so required or to furnish additional 
sureties when required, as herein provided, (he 
board or officer charged with (he duty of approving 
the bond of such officer shall declare such office 
vacant within sixty days after notice personally 
served upon (he officer, and at (he expiration of 
said sixty-day period such office shall become 
vacant unless such sureties justify or additional 
qualified sureties be furnished within said period. 
I9SJ 
Chapter 2. Failure to Qualify for Office 
52-2-1. Time in which to qualify - Failure • 
Office declared vacant. 
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed to 
any office of the state or any of its political subdi-
visions, fails to qualify for such office within sixty 
days after (he date of beginning of the (erm of 
office for which he was elected or appointed, such 
office shall thereupon become vacant and shall be 
filled as provided by law. Whenever the bond of any 
officer of the state or of any of its political subdiv-
isions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise 
becomes void or of no effect, without another 
proper bond being given so that continuance of 
bonded protection is afforded, the office of such 
officer shall (hereupon become vacant and shall be 
filled as provided by law. Any elec(ed or appointed 
official who has failed on the effecdve da(e of this 
act to qualify for (he position to which he was 
elected or appointed, shall be deemed to come 
within (he provisions of (his act, and the office of 
such officer shall become vacant at the end of forty 
days after (he effective date of this act unless legal 
bond is given before the expiration of such period, 
and such office shall be filled as provided by law. 
m j 
Chapter 3. 
Relatives 
Prohibiting Employment of 
S2-3-I. Employ meat or relatives prohibited 
Exceptions. 
52-3*2. Each day of violation a separate offense. 
52-3-3. Penalty. 
52-3-4. Exception in towns. 
52-3-1. Employment of relatives prohibited • 
Exceptions. 
It is unlawful for any person holding any position 
(he compensation for which is paid out of public 
funds to employ, appoint, or vote for the appoint-
ment uf; his ui lici fAtliefr'Timtlier/husMnd, wire,' 
son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, 
niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-
law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-
law, or daughter-in-law in or to any position or 
employment, when the salary, wages, pay or com-
pensation of such appointee is to be paid out of any 
public funds. It is unlawful for such appointee to 
accept or to retain such employment when his initial 
•appointment thereto was made in contravention of 
the foregoing sentence by a person within (he 
degrees of consanguinity or affinity (herein specified 
having the direc( power of employment or appoint-
ment (o such posuion, or by a board or group of 
which such person is a member. 
The provisions of (his section shall not apply 
among others to the following employment situat-
ions: 
(a) Where (he employee or appointee was appoi-
nted or employed by a department or agency of (he 
state of Utah or a political subdivision thereof prio£ 
(0 the time during which said related person 
assumed said public position therein. 
(b) Where (he employee or appointee was appojj 
nted or employed subsequent to (he time durinf 
which said related person assumed said public pop 
ition but prior to (he effective date of this act tot 
his appointment was not in contravention of (he 
provisions of (his chapter in effect at the time.of 
appointment. 
(c) Where the employee or appointee was or « 
eligible or qualified to be employed by a department 
or agency of the state of Utah or a political subdi. 
vision thereof as the result of his compliance with 
civil service laws or regulations and merit system 
laws or regulations or as the result of a certification 
as to his qualification and fitness by a department 
agency or subdivision of (he state authorized so>u> 
do by law. 
(d) Where the employee or appointee was oris 
employed by the employing unit because he was or 
is the only person available, qualified or eligible for 
(he position. tag 
52-3-2. Each day of violation a separate offense. 
Each day any such person, father, mother, 
husband, wife, son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, 
aunt, nephew, niece, first cousins, moth-r-in-law, 
father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, 
son-in-law or daughter-in-law, is retained in 
office by any of said officials shall be regarded as i 
separate offense. its 
52-3-3. Penalty. 
Any person violating any of the provisions of this 
chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor. \m 
52-3-4. Exception in (owns. 
In towns, this chapter shall not apply to the 
employment of uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces or 
cousins. WSJ 
Chapter 4. Open and Public Meetings 
52-4*1. Declaration of public policy. 
52-4.2. Definition*. 
.52-4*3. Meetings open to Ike public • Exception*. 
52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of member* 
Business - Reasons for meeting recorded. 
52-4-5. Purposes of dosed meeting* - Chance meeting* 
and social meeting* excluded • Disruption of meeting*. 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
52-4-7. Minute* of open meeting* • Public record* 
Recording of meeting*. 
52-44. Suit lo avoid final action • Limitation 
Exception*. 
%*4*f. enforcement orchapier • auu 10 compel 
compliance. 
52-4-1. Declaration of public policy. 
In enacting (his chapter, the legislature finds and 
declares that the state, its agencies and politic* 
subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of (h< 
people's business. It is the intent of the law that 
(heir actions be taken openly and (hat (heir delibe-
rations be conducted openly. itrt 
52-4-2. Definitions. 
As used in (his ace 
(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public 
body, with a quorum present, whether corporal or 
by means of electronic equipment, for the purpose 
of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the 
public body has jurisdiction or advisory power. This 
chapter shall not apply to chance meetings. 
"Convening/ as used in (his subsection, means the 
calling of a meeting of a public body by a person or 
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persons authorized to do so for the express purpose 
jf discussing or acting upon a subject over which 
that public body has jurisdiction. 
(2) "Public body" means any administrative, 
idit$ory% executive or legislative body of the state or 
,t> political subdivisions which consists of two or 
more persons that expends, disburses or is supported 
.it whole or in part by tax revenue and which is 
vc^ cd with the authority to make decisions regar-
jmg the public's business. "Public body" does not 
ncludc any political party, group or caucus or rules 
or sifting committees of the legislature. 
(3) "Quorum* means a simple majority of the 
membership of a public body, unless otherwise 
defined by applicable law, but a quorum does not 
include a meeting of two elected officials by them-
selves when no aaion, either formal or informal, is 
laken on a subject over which these elected officials 
have jurisdiction. mi 
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public -
Exceptions. 
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed 
pursuant to sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5. \m 
52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of 
members • Business - Reasons for meeting 
recorded. 
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirma-
tive vote of two-thirds of the members of the 
public body present at an open meeting for which 
notice is given pursuant to section 52-4-6; prov-
ided, a quorum is present. No closed meeting is 
allowed except as to matters exempted under section 
52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, 
regulation, contract, or appointment shall be appr-
oved at a closed meeting. The reason or reasons for 
holding a closed meeting and the vote, either for or 
against the proposition to hold such a meeting, cast 
by each member by name shall be entered on the 
minutes of the meeting. 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
require any meeting to be closed to the public. \m 
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings - Chance 
meetings and social meetings excluded • 
Disruption of meetings. 
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to 
action 52-4-4 for any of the following purposes: 
(a) Discussion of the character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health of an 
individual; 
(b) Strategy sessions with respect to collective 
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real property; 
(c) Discussion regarding deployment of security 
personnel or devices; and 
(d) Investigative proceedings regarding allegations 
of criminal misconduct. 
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance 
meeting or a social meeting. No chance meeting or 
xfcial meeting shall be used to circumvent this 
chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of 
any person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the 
cx
*ent that orderly conduct is seriously comprom-
J
*d.
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*-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
(I) Any public body which holds regular meetings 
lhai
 are scheduled in advance over the course of a 
>car shall give public notice at least once each year 
of
 'is annual meeting schedule as provided in this 
Sccuon. The public notice shall specify the date. 
l,me, and place of such meetings. 
0.) In addition to the notice requirements of 
&*• 
subsection (I) of this section, each public body shall 
give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the 
agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings. 
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by: 
(a) Posting written notice at the principal office 
of the public body, or if no such office exists, at the 
building where the meeting is to be held; and 
(b) Providing notice to at least one newspaper 
of general circulation within the geographic jurisdi-
ction of the public body, or to a local media corre-
spondent. 
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it 
is necessary for a public body to hold an emergency 
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or 
urgent nature, the notice requirements of section 52-
4-6(2) may be disregarded and the best notice 
practicable given. No such emergency meeting of a 
public body shall be held unless an attempt has been 
made to notify alt of its members and a majority 
votes in the affirmative to hold the meeting. t*?i 
52-4-7. Minutes of open meetings - Public 
records • Recording of meetings. 
(1) Written minutes shall be kept of all open 
meetings. Such minutes shall include: 
(a) The date, time and place of the meeting; 
(b) The names of members present and absent; 
(c) The substance of ail matters proposed, discu-
ssed, or decided, and a record, by individual 
member, of votes taken; 
(d) The names of all citizens who appeared and 
the substance in brief of their testimony; 
(e) Any other information that any member req-
uests be entered in the minutes. 
(2) Written minutes shall be kept of all closed 
meetings. Such minutes shall include: 
(a) The date, time and place of the meeting; 
(b) The names of members present and absent; 
(c) The names of all others present except where 
such disclosure would infringe on the confidence 
necessary to fulfill the original purpose of closing 
the meeting. 
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be 
available within a reasonable time after the meeting. 
(4) All or any part of an open meeting may be 
recorded by any person in attendance; provided, the 
recording does not interfere with the conduct of the 
meeting. mi 
52*4-8. Suit to avoid final action - Limitation 
- Exceptions. 
Any final action taken in violation of sections 52-
4-3 and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of comp-
etent jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be 
commenced within 90 days after the action except 
that with respect to any final aaion concerning the 
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days 
after the action. i*7t 
52-4-9. Enforcement of chapter • Suit to compel 
compliance. 
(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of 
the state shall enforce this chapter. 
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter 
may commence suit in a court of competent jurisd-
iction to compel compliance with or enjoin violat-
ions of this chapter or to determine its applicability 
to discussions or decisions of a public body. The 
court may award reasonable attorney fees and court 
costs to a successful plaintiff. \m 
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EXCERPT FROM: RICHFIELD CITY POLICY DEPARTMENT 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES Policy No. 10 
Date January 1, 1979 
Subject fttpartmental Discipline 
Effective Date January 1, 1979 
This directive shall supersede all other departmental polircies* 
dealing with departmental discipline* 
Persons Subject to Disciplinary Action 
A. Any officer wfeo violates his trust by committing 
any offense punishable under the laws, ordinances/ or 
statutes of the United States, the State of Utah, the City 
of Richfield; or who violates any provisions of the Rules 
and Regulations of the Richfield City Police Department; or 
who disobeys any lawful order; or who is incompetent to 
perform his duties; is subject to appropriate disciplinary 
action. 
B. The word "discipline11 is a derivative of the latin word 
"disciplina", meaning instruction or education. The 
purpose of discipline is to facilitate coordination of 
effort. Positive discipline is an inner personal desire to 
observe and follow the regulations and procedures of an 
organization. Negative discipline is compliance through 
fear of punishment or penalty. It is the hope that all 
officers will exercise positive discipline. 
C. Penalties - Subject to the anproval of the Chief of Police, 
the following penalties may be imposed against any 
officer or employee of the Department as disciplinary 
action: 
1) Verbal rer-^,dnd' 
Suspension. 
4) Demotion. 
5) Dismissal. 
Departmental Authority to Discipline 
D. Pinal departmental disciplinary authority and responsibility 
rests with the Chief of Police. Except for verbal 
reprimands and emergency suspensions, all departmental 
discipline must be taken or approved by the Chief of 
Police. 
E. Other supervisory personnel may take the following 
disciplinary measures: 
1) Verbal reprimand. 
2) Written reprimand (subject to approval by the commanding 
officer). 
3) Emergency suspensions. 
4) Written recommendations for other penalties. 
F. Emergency Suspension - Any command or supervisory officer 
has the authority to impose emergency suspension until the 
next business day against an officer or employee when it is 
apparant that such action is in the best interest of the 
Department. 
G. Follow-Up Action on Emergency Suspension - An officer or 
employee receiving an emergency suspension shall be 
required to report to the Chief of Police on the next business 
day at 1000 hours (10:00 a.m.) unless otherwise directed 
by compet~enE~~authority. The command or supervisory officer 
imposing or recommending the suspension shall also report 
to the Chief of Police at the same time. 
Complaints Against Police Personnel 
H. All complaints arising externally (from outside the Police 
Department) shall be brought to the attention of the Chief 
immediately, 
I. Internal complaints shall be brought to the attention of 
the Chief or other supervisory officer. 
J. All complaints against Police Personnel shall be reduced 
to written form. 
K. A supervisory officer receiving an internal complaint shall 
conduct an immediate investigation into the allegation. If 
the allegation is substantiated he shall then take action to 
correct the infraction immediately. 
Reports of Disciplinary Action Taken or Recommended 
L. Whenever disciplinary action is taken or recommended, 
(except for oral reprimand) a written report must be 
submitted immediately containing the following information: 
1) The name, rank, and present assignment of the person 
being disciplined. 
2) The date(s) and time(s) of the misconduct and the 
location(s)• 
3) The section number(s) of this manual violated and/or 
the common name for the infraction. 
4) A complete statement of the facts of the misconduct,. 
5) The punishment imposed or recommended. 
*) The written signature and rank of the preparing 
officer and his position in relation to the 
member being disciplined. 
M. Distribution of Reports of Disciplinary Action -
The report shall be distributed as follows by the 
officer imposing or recommending disciplinary action: 
1) Original and copy to the Chief via the complete 
chain of cormand. 
2) CODV to the person being charged. 
1) CODV to the Citv Manaaer. 
4) Copy retained by officer imposing or recommending 
the action. 
H. Endorsement and Forxvarding of Disciplinary Reports -
Each level in the chain of command must endorse and 
forward reports bearing on disciplinary matters 
received. Suc"^  r ivlorsements may be one of approval, 
disapproval or modification. No r.-fuber or employee 
shall alter or ct.i-se to be altered or withdraw any 
disciplinary reoort. Disciplinary reports in transit 
through the chain of command shall not be delayed, 
but must be reviewed, endorsed, and forxvarded as soon 
as nossible. Disciplinary reports shall be filed in 
accordance with current departmental directives. 
O. Informing the Person Being Disciplined - The member 
or employee beinq disciplined shall be informed of the 
charges and penalties at the time such action is taken. 
P. Citizen Complaints Against Police Personnel 
Complaints by citizens against members or employees 
of this Department shall be processed in the following 
manner: 
1) During Normal Business Hours - Such complaints 
will be referred to the Chief unless it is of 
such minor or invalid nature that the officer 
first contacted can dispose of the incident 
satisfactorily4 
2) Other Times - Outside normal business hours, the 
officer receiving the complaint shall notify the 
senior officer on duty who will take one of the 
following actions: 
a) Instruct the receivinq officer to investigate 
b) Receive and investigate the complaint himself. 
c) Notify the Chief or commanding officer when he 
feels such action is necessary. 
I n y e s t i g a t i o n ^ o f ^ll^rr^cl Mi sronHnri* R p n n r f s Arr?H n^t* 
Officers -
Any officer assigned the investigation of an alleged 
act of misconduct on the part of a member or employee 
of this Pepartment shall conduct a thorough and accurate 
investigation. 
Such investigation shall include formal statements from 
all parties concerned, when necessary and pertinent, 
the gathering and preservation* of any physical evidence 
pertaining to the case, and all other information 
bearing on the matter. 
R. Investigation Reports - The investigation of alleged 
acts of misconduct must be reduced to writing and 
include the following: 
1) A summary of the complaint or alleged act of 
misconduct. 
2) Pertinent portions of the statements of all 
parties to the incident* 
3) A description of the incident, physical evidence, 
and other evidence important to the case. 
4) The observation and conclusions of the investigating 
officer. 
Distribution of Investigative Reports -
The report shall be distributed as follows by the 
officer conductinq the investigation: 
1) Original to the Chief. 
2) Copy to the City Manager. 
Actions That Can Result in Disciplinary Action -
If an investigation determines that an officer or 
employee is guilty of any of the following offenses, 
he shall be either reprimanded, suspended, or dismissed; 
according to the nature and seriousness of the offense: 
1) Willful violation of the rules, regulations, and 
policies of the Department. 
2) Shielding the actions or abetting a fellow officer 
in the violation of any law or departmental 
regulation or policy. 
3) Insubordination, and/or the disrespect to a 
superior officer. 
4) Failure to comply with the valid verbal orders of -a 
superior officer. 
5) Failing to assist a fellow officer when requested, 
in accomplishing an arrest or in serving a legal 
process, 
6) Conduct subversive to the crood order and disciplin€ 
within—the—Department-. 
7) The use of disrespectful language toward or 
concerning any fellow officer or an employee* 
S) Making derogatory remarks about other officers or 
employees either to members of the Department or 
to any person outside the Department unless it is 
done as a formal statement to a superior officer or 
an official investigative board. 
9) The tibe cr unnecessary violence or discourtesy 
against a prisoner. 
10) Discourtesy toward any citizen. 
11) Incompetence or unwillingness to render satisfactory 
service, as shown by performance evaluations below 
satisfactory standards or as otherwise determined by 
supervisory officers. 
12) Absence without leave or failure to notify the 
proper authority concerning an absence. 
13) Falsely reporting reason for absence as being sick. 
14) Sleeping while on duty. 
15) Acts involving moral turpitude including immorality, 
indecency, lewdness, or dishonesty. 
16) Intoxication and/or the use of intoxicating drugs 
or beverages while on duty or at any time while 
in uniform. No officer or employee shall appear on 
duty in an unfit condition due to the comsumption of 
alcohol! "Unfit condition" shall mean having 
any measurable amount of alcohol in the blood. 
17) Undue familiarity with persons of bad repute. 
18) Failure to pay just debts. 
19) Knowingly allowing another person to use an 
officer's badge and/or identification card. 
(£o) Disclosure of confidential information to un-
authorized persons. 
21) Continued or gross neglect; of personal appearance, 
of duty, or in the use of departmental materials 
and equipment. 
22) Negligent or willful damage to City property. 
23) Failure to respond to proper assignments. 
24) Failure to submit proper reports. 
25) Failure to appear in Court at the proper time and 
place after receiving notification of trial or 
hearing. 
26) Failure to maintain a clean an^ functioning firearm. 
This shall apply whether the weapon is personally 
owned or issued by the Department. 
27) The acceptance of any gratuity. 
23) Conduct unbecoming a professional police officer 
such as to brincj one's self, the City, or the 
Department into disrepute. 
29) Other forms of misconduct as determined by the 
administrative officials of the Deportment and 
the City. 
T. Actions That Shall Result in Direct Dismissal -
If an investigation determines that an officer or 
is guilty of anv of the following offenses, he shall 
be dismissed from the Department: 
1) Conviction of the violation of any ordinance, 
statute, or law, the violation of which is consid-
ered to be a serious offense. 
2) The acceptance of mon^y or anything of value, 
in consideration for refraining from taking proper 
legal action against any person suspected of the 
commission of a crime. 
3) The material falsification of an application for 
employment. 
4) The use of bribery or political influence to secure 
employment in the Department or advantages while 
so employed. 
Rehabilitation -
Whenever possible, personnel will be warned and 
given an opportunity to innrove before dismissal is 
made. 
A member or officer may be claced on probation for a 
specified nerio^ cf time if circumstances warrant it. 
During this time, he wi] 1 be closely supervised and 
evaluated with the hope of salvaging such individual. 
Exit Interviews 
p'xxt- interviews nay be hold -with -the Chief of PoliGe 
if desired by the dismissed person. 
Appeals -
A member of the Department may request a review of 
disciplinary action by submitting a written request 
to the Chief of Police. Additional appeal procedures 
may be followed as outlined in the Richfield City 
Personnel Policies and Procedures manual. 
Dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield City 
Appeals Board. Procedures for such appeals are outlined 
in the Richfield City Personnel Folicies and Procedures 
manual. 
WARD V. RICHFIELD CITY, 716 P.2d 265 (UTAH 1984) 
Boyd A. WARD, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
WARD v. RICHFIELD CITY Utah 265 
Cite as 716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984) 
2. Statutes ®=»212.6 
Statute is construed on assumption 
that each term is used advisedly and that 
intent of legislature is-revealed in use of 
term in context and structure in which it is 
placed. 
3. Municipal Corporations <s=>182 
U.C.A.1953,10-3-918, which deals with 
appointment of chief of police in third-class 
cities, does not make removal of chief of 
police in such cities free from judicial over-
sight, in light of statutes dealing with re-
moval of chief of police from first and 
second class cities, which expressly make 
such removal unreviewable, and thus, trial 
court had jurisdiction to review action of 
city counsel of third class city in firing 
chief of police. U.C.A.1953, 10-3-911. 
RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal 
corporation, et al., Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 18431. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 16, 1984. 
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1986. 
Terminated city chief of police brought 
action seeking to be reinstated and recover 
damages. The Sixth District Court, Sevier 
County, Don V. Tibbs, J., granted city's 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, 
And chief appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, J., held that statute which deals 
with appointment of chief of police in third-
clasn cities does not make removal of chief 
of police in such cities free from all judicial 
oversight, in light of statutes dealing with 
removal of chief of police from first and 
tecond class cities, which expressly make 
•uch removal free from judicial review, and 
thus, trial court had jurisdiction to review 
action of city counsel of third class city in 
firing chief of police. 
Order set aside and case remanded 
with directions. 
I. Municipal Corporations «»182 
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-909 to 10-3-911, 
which respectively, require cities of first 
**1 »econd class to create police depart-
"*tu*, vest board of commissioners with 
**thority to prescribe administration of po-
* • department and to appoint head of de-
£**ent, and provide that chief of police 
*t**ment may be removed by board of 
^ i w i o n e r s without hearing or review 
J £>urts, by their references to authority 
^ ° ^ d of commissioners over police de-
j7^e T\t, are limited to first and second 
m ££**> i n which board of commission- „ , ,~. 
_ ^ t; such statutes do not apply to less, on June 8 the council in an 
*-» deoartmo f^o ,v .u:^ ., ,.,._ meeting ratified its action of April 2. p t ents in third-class cities. 
George E. Brown, Jr., Midvale, for plain-
tiff and appellant 
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for defend-
ants and respondents. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiff Boyd A. Ward appeals from an 
order granting defendant Richfield City's 
motion to dismiss his complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
On April 2, 1981, Ward was terminated 
as chief of police of the city of Richfield, a 
third-class city, when the city council went 
into a closed meeting to consider "other 
business/' According to a stipulation 
made by counsel for both sides, that action 
was entered in the minutes after the closed 
session concluded. On June 7, 1981, Ward 
brought this action to be reinstated and to 
recover damages alleging that the closed 
meeting of the council had violated U.C.A., 
1953, § 52-4-1, et seq., commonly known 
as the Open and Public Meetings Act He 
also obtained a temporary restraining order 
against Richfield City, restraining it from 
taking any further action on the termi-
nation until the legality of its action could 
be decided by the district court Neverthe-
open 
At a 
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hearing for a preliminary injunction, Rich-
field City made a motion to dismiss plain-
tiffs complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 
The court determined that pursuant to 
U.C.A., 1953, § 10-3-911, it had no jurisdic-
tion to review the act of the city council in 
firing the chief of police and granted the 
motion. That order is the sole issue before 
us for review. 
Section 10-3-911 provides in pertinent 
part: 
The chief of the police or fire department 
of the cities may at any time be removed, 
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to 
be heard, by the board of commissioners 
whenever in its opinion the good of the 
service will be served thereby. Its action 
in removing the chief of either depart-
ment shall be final and conclusive and 
shall not 6e receivetf or caffetf in question 
before any court. [Emphasis added.] 
Section 10-3-911 is preceded by § 10-3-
909 mandating cities of the first and second 
class to create police departments and by 
§ 10-3-910 vesting the board of commis-
sioners with authority to prescribe the ad-
ministration of the police departments by 
ordinance and to appoint the head of that 
department. Under § 10-l-104(2)(a), the 
governing body for cities of the first and 
second class is a city commission composed 
of a mayor and four or two commissioners, 
§ 10-3-103 and 104. Under § 10-1-
104(2Xb), the governing body for cities of 
the third class is the city council composed 
of a mayor and five councilmen, § 10-3-
105. 
[1-3] It is readily apparent that §§ 10-
3-909, 929 and 922 with their references to 
the authority of the board of commission-
ers over police departments unmistakably 
refer to and are limited to first and second-
class cities where boards of commissioners 
exist These sections were not intended by 
the Legislature to apply to police depart-
ments in third-class cities such as Richfield. 
Police departments in third-class cities and 
towns are dealt with separately in § 10-3-
918, which provided at the time this case 
arose: 
In cities of the third class and in towns, 
the governing body may appoint a chief 
of police or marshal who shall exercise 
and perform such duties as may be pre-
scribed by the governing body. The 
chief of police or marshal shall be under 
the direction, control and supervision of 
the mayor. The chief of police or mar-
shal may, with the consent of the mayor, 
appoint assistants to the chief of police 
or marshal. 
Conspicuously absent from this statute is 
the provision contained in § 10-3-911 mak-
ing the removal of a chief of police free 
from all judicial oversight. "It probably is 
Hot wholly inaccurate to suppose that ordi-
narily when people say one thing they do 
not mean something else." 2A C. Sands, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.-
0l, as cited in Hansen v. Wilkinson, Utah; 
Q58 P.2d 1216 (1983). We construe a stat-
ute on the assumption that each term is 
Used advisedly and that the intent of the 
Legislature is revealed in the use of the 
term in the context and structure in which 
it is placed. 
Richfield City relies on several cases to 
bolster its argument that stare decisis sup^  
ftorts a finding of no jurisdiction. It also 
cites us to § 10-1-110 which directs that 
statutes such as § 10-3-911 which were 
Enacted in 1977 as part of the "Utah Munic-
ipal Code" should be construed as the con-
tinuation of prior statutes so long as the 
Provisions are the same or substantially the 
Same. In Taylor v. Gunderson, 107 Utah 
437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944) we held that a 
town marshall of a third-class city could be 
removed without cause. However, the 
statute then in force (U.C.A., 1943, § 15-^ 
$2) was repealed by the enactment of the 
1977 Municipal Code and § 10-3-911 is in 
no wise substantially the same. In Skeen 
v. Browning, 32 Utah 164, 89 P. 642 (1907). 
the statutes specifically made actions of-
the mayor and city council in removing 
heads of police and fire departments final 
and nonreviewable. Sec. 8, p. 46, Act 1899r 
Ih State t/. Stavar, Utah, 578 P.2d 847 
(1978) we did not reach the issue presented 
ih the instant case. None of these cases to 
helpful here. 
BENNION v. GULF OIL CORP. 
Cite as 716 PJtd 267 (Utah 1985) 
Utah 267 
The order dismissing plaintiffs com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction was in error 
and is set aside. The case is remanded to 
the trial court with directions to allow 
plaintiff to proceed on the merits of his 
case. Costs are awarded to appellant 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Richfield City has petitioned for rehear-
ing pointing out that the court's opinion did 
not cite nor rely upon Jolley v. Lindon 
City, Utah, 684 P.2d 47 (1984). fe ac-
knowledge our oversight That case, too, 
involved the firing of the chief of police in 
a third class city. However, the contention 
there made by the appellant chief of police 
was that U.C.A., 1953, § 10-3-911 could 
not apply to him because he was dis-
charged for investigating a city councilman 
in his official duties. The contention was 
not there made, as in the instant case, that 
section 10-3-911 does not in any instance 
apply to chiefs of police in third class cities. 
In a per curiam opinion, we held that since 
aection 10-3-911 contained no exceptions, it 
was inconsequential why the chief was dis-
missed. We also found lacking merit the 
appellant's contention that the city council 
had not formally dismissed him. Again, no 
contention was made that the city council 
lacked that statutory power. 
After careful consideration of the appel-
lant's petition for rehearing, we deny it and 
overrule Jolley v. Lindon City, supra, in-
«ofar as our decision in that case conflicts 
*ith our opinion in the instant case. Fur-
thermore, we have carefully examined 
Chapter 3 of Title 10 and have found that 
J* each instance when the term "Board of 
Commissioners" is used, it refers only to 
the governing body of cities of the first and 
»<*ond class. We can find no instance in 
wh
»ch that term was used to refer to the 
jtoverning body of cities generally, includ-
e s a city council in a third class city. In 
Chapter 3, the term "governing body" is 
consistently used (over seventy-five times) 
when reference is made to cities generally, 
that is, of all three classes. 
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., did not participate 
herein. 
(O ittYMJM8tK$YSUM> 
S.H. BENNION, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
GULF OIL CORPORATION, a Pennsyl-
vania corporation, and the Utah State 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, an agen-
cy of the State of Utah, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 19144. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 19, 1985. 
Rehearing Denied March 21, 1986. 
Nonconsenting mineral interest owner 
appealed order of Board of Oil, Gas, and 
Mining which designated second well on oil 
drilling unit as the production well and 
which ordered nonconsenting owner to pay 
proportionate share of drilling cost The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Timothy Hanson, J., entered summary 
judgment in favor of oil producer and 
Board, and nonconsenting owner appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining had no au-
thority to allow test well to displace pro-
duction well from common source of supply 
on oil drilling unit and to charge noncon-
senting mineral interest owner for propor-
tionate share of cost of drilling. 
Board's order vacated and remanded 
with instruction. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result 
